Paper long abstract:

Although trajectories of the Central Asian states have been substantially diverse since their independence, the overall tendency is that authoritarian political regimes have been consolidated domestically, while Russia and China have (re)strengthened their influence in this region. At first glance, it may seem that the Central Asian states' foreign policy orientation corresponds to the domestic one: they have entered a league of authoritarian nations, while the West has been unsuccessful in promoting democracy due to its lack of strong linkage and leverage in Central Asia. However, there are a number of indications that political regime and foreign relations do not always correlate. Authoritarian leaders have not always been pro-Russian and anti-Western, while relatively democratic Kyrgyzstan has been maintaining close relations with Russia and China, occasionally demonstrating anti-Western attitudes, especially after the "democratic" revolution of 2010. Based on extensive analysis of documents and interviews, I argue that there are two particularly important aspects of the relationship between domestic political regime and international politics in Central Asia. First, as the authority of Central Asian political leaders ultimately depends on the overwhelming support of the people, their policy selectively reflects popular nationalism. They sometimes make use of anti-Westernism, but they reject anti-Chinese nationalism because of the importance of China as an economic partner. Second, in earlier years there were indeed tensions with the West over problems of democracy and human rights, and non-Western countries could play the role of "black knights," but in recent years democracy and human rights have become less salient in the international political agenda in Central Asia. Through the analysis of these phenomena, we can get insights into the elements of national populism in today's authoritarianism, as well as the decreasing relevance of democracy promotion in international politics.