Paper long abstract:

Do Kyrgyz legislators act as democratic representatives of their constituents, or are they still playing by more authoritarian rules of the game? In this paper, I distinguish between "democratic" and "authoritarian" representation. Under democratic representation, deputies respond to the strong electoral connection by voting to advance the interests of their constituents, especially as elections draw near. Under authoritarian representation, deputies engage in more limited contestation that provides information to government leaders about constituent interests, but does not directly challenge the regime.

Using data on roll-call votes (2016-2018), I identify which type of representation best explains the behavior of Jogorku Kenesh deputies. First, I argue deputies engaging in authoritarian representation concentrate their dissent in non-strategic issue areas and on opposition-initiated policies. Furthermore, dissent always declines over the course of the legislative process, regardless of whether substantial amendments are made. Second, I argue that deputies engaging in democratic representation will dissent on any policy that harms their constituents, particularly as elections approach. In this case, dissent only declines over the course of the legislative process if substantial changes are made to the legislation's text. In general, I find support for the authoritarian representation hypotheses, although certain parties act more democratically than others.

These findings have implications for how we view legislatures in transitional contexts, suggesting that we should not overestimate their effectiveness at promoting democracy. They also demonstrate that transitioning between authoritarian and democratic practices is an uneven process.