Paper long abstract:

Patrons in illiberal governance systems are expected to spread the state's largess selectively, channeling the most benefits to their networks of cronies. Regions with governing elites that are proximate to the elites in the central government enjoy the most advantages in such patron-client cronyist systems. This empirical study evaluates whether the congruence in formal relationships between regional leadership and the federal government influences the levels of regional debt in the Russian Federation. Using regional government data for Russian regions and their municipalities for 2005-2015, we test three formal hypotheses. 1) Does congruence in political affiliation between regional governors and the federal government influence the levels of debt in the regions? Governors that are from a proximate political party to the ruling elite in the federal government are expected to have a significant impact on regional debt. 2) Does direct appointment of regional governors influence the levels of debt in the regions? Russia shifted back and forth in its approach of selecting regional governors, alternating between elected and appointed governorships in the period under review. 3) Do divided governments in the regions (represented by the distance between elected/appointed governors and regional legislatures) influence the levels of debt in the regions? It is expected that maximum largess accrues in the regions with unified executive and legislative branches of government that are most proximately related to the governing regime at the federal level.