Paper long abstract:

The literature on mass mobilization in Central Asia has long posited that elites, both state-affiliated and non-state ones, play a central role in mobilizing or immobilizing the masses that can challenge the authority of ruling governments. Yet, in what appears to weaken the elite-led theory of protests in Central Asia, the April 2010 anti-government protests in Kyrgyzstan and the December 2011 Zhanaozen and May 2016 nation-wide protests against perceived Chinese expansion in Kazakhstan demonstrate that players with few resources and non-elite status have emerged and they are capable of organizing nationwide protests. The main purpose of the paper is to closely examine this new phenomenon in Central Asian politics. The chief claim of the paper is that relying on various tools of control, the Central Asian governments have curtailed the capacity of both elite and non-elite actors to mobilize masses. This development is both a blessing and a curse for Central Asia. In the short-term, without much leadership, most protests are likely to remain localized and disorganized.In the long-run, the lack of leadership over protests makes protests more unmanaged and thus "deadly" for the Central Asian governments, turning the whole Central Asia politically wobbly.