Paper long abstract:

This paper examines the form and ideological content of Communist Party propaganda in Kazakhstan during the 1930s (1929-1939). It argues that the form of propaganda - the method by which propagandists conveyed information to the Kazakh populace (usually through classes, lectures, and reading circles) - undermined the transformative impact of its content. Soviet propaganda in Kazakhstan during the 1930s was plagued by chronic shortcomings such as poorly trained propagandists, shortages of print resources, as well as disinterest in propaganda work by local, regional, and even high ranking Communist Party officials. Furthermore, the bureaucracy of the Party propaganda department interpreted the number of propaganda events, rather than the transformative effect of propaganda on Soviet Kazakh society, as a measure of success and equated declarations to improve propaganda work as actual improvements in propaganda work. This bureaucratic culture meant that many of the above-mentioned shortcomings remained unresolved for the duration of the Stalinist period and both factors served to undermine the transformative impact of communist ideology in Kazakhstan, rather than reinforce it.

My paper relies on Marshal McLuhan's paradigm of "the medium is the message" to explain the effect of flawed Soviet propaganda on the Kazakh populace. McLuhan argues the true message of a medium is not its content, but the change in thinking that the transmission technologies engender on society. The chronic shortcomings of propaganda combined with the reality that the experience of normal people in Kazakhstan did not correspond with what the propaganda was promising. Rather than indoctrinating and mobilizing Kazakhs as flag-bearers of Soviet communism, the problems with propaganda limited Kazakh allegiance to and faith in the Communist Party and the Soviet state.

In contrast to previous studies on Soviet propaganda, I prioritize the mechanics of propaganda production and dissemination over propaganda content. While examining propaganda content is an important component of gauging the effect that propaganda might have had on Kazakh society, I argue the mechanics by which this content flowed from the halls of the Kremlin to the Central Asian steppe played a more decisive role in the Soviet state's ability to rule over its population and to make the Kazakhs Soviet. This paper is based on the bureaucratic correspondence of the Kazakh Communist Party's propaganda and agitation department, as well as other archival materials such as lesson plans, instructional texts, and ideological publications from archives in both Russia and Kazakhstan.