Paper long abstract:

The civil war in Guinea-Bissau between 1998 and 1999 set back political, economic and social development in an already unstable and fragile state. In the wake of the conflict the UN established the Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS). There were four strands to its mandate. Primarily, it was charged with creating an enabling environment for peace-building and reconciliation. Secondly, it was to help the government disarm the populace. Thirdly, it was to facilitate understanding and cooperation between Guinea-Bissau and neighbouring countries, the international community and the regional organisation the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Finally, UNOGBIS was to move the democratic process forward, restore the rule of law, and oversee a set of elections that would establish genuine democratic institutions. Seven years after its formation only faltering progress has been made toward the fulfilment of the mandate with the country suffering a series of coups d'etat, attempted coups d'etat, political assassinations, a fractured political space, continued conflict with militia elements in neighbouring Senegal and worsening poverty. The paper examines the record of UNOGBIS and questions whether internal procedures and external relations with other stakeholders in the peace-building process obstructed its ability to address the mandate. It questions whether UNOGBIS was 'fit for purpose', why the process of knowledge transfer failed, and why the UN in Guinea-Bissau did not achieve the status of a learning organisation.