Paper long abstract

Godfather politics has cast a dark shadow on Nigeria's return to democracy. The calculated influence of powerful individuals in the selection of political party nominees and the manipulation of electoral results to secure political office for such persons in order to service their private interests has so far played a major role in shaping democratic processes in Nigeria.

American writer and journalist, Ambrose Bierce has described politics as "a strife of interest masquerading as a contest of principles; the conduct of public affairs for private advantage", Chief Audu Ogbeh, the former Chairman of the PDP (Nigeria's governing party) has echoed this sentiment by describing "the crisis of politics in Nigeria as the management of mischief". This paper seeks to investigate the "godfather" phenomenon and what it says about political party financing practices in Nigeria as well as its electoral practices. This paper will also explore how godfatherism aligns itself with popular political discourses on democratisation in Africa.

The ritual of elections has often been upheld as a crucial characteristic of political participation and representation. On the flipside of this viewpoint is the argument that though the process of elections might indicate an expansion of democratic space and signify political contestation it very well can occur as a mere façade covering up the asphyxiated "prospects of alternation of power". This paper will hopefully examine both sides of this debate.

The campaign finance fiasco in Anambra state, Southeast Nigeria reveals how notorious and ingrained the problem of godfatherism is. Political affairs in Anambra after the 2003 elections unfolded themselves like scenes from a very bizarre and disturbing stage show. The round of gubernatorial elections that ushered in Chief Chris Nwabueze Ngige into office was also the official debut of (arguably) Anambra's most infamous and litigious character, self-proclaimed godfather Chief Chris Uba.

Chief Uba was quoted in many national papers boasting that he single-handedly installed all elected officials in the state and was wholly responsible for Dr Ngige's victory at the polls. Simultaneously, Dr. Ngige ascribed high praises to Chief Uba, acknowledging that his gubernatorial success had a lot to do with Uba's influence. This cosy "godfather - godson" relationship however went horribly sour when allegedly Ngige refused to honour his side of the agreement he'd made with Uba on state contracts and finance. This 'flagrant impudence' infuriated Chief Uba and with the help of the state Police Force he abducted 'democratically - elected' governor Ngige and using his connections in the state House of Assembly removed him from office. Ngige's nightmare was luckily ended when he was rescued and reinstated. This however was not the end of this battle of elephants and as the adage goes it's the grass that suffers, in this case the people of Anambra state.

Paper long abstract

Analyses of the rise of violent vigilantism in Africa have focused increasingly on the 'uncivil' character of African society. This article challenges the recourse to cultural or instrumentalist explanations in which vigilantism is portrayed as a reversion to violent indigenous institutions of law and order based on secret societies and occultist practices, or is viewed as a product of the contemporary institutional environment of clientism and corruption in which youth struggle for their share of patronage resources. It is argued that there is very little room in this framework for understanding the relation of vigilantism to popular struggles for security and accountability, or for recognizing how an environment of poverty, state withdrawal and political liberalization have contributed to the vulnerability of genuine civil initiatives to the machinations of more powerful political groups. The social and political complexities of contemporary African vigilantism are revealed through an account of the rise and derailment of the infamous Bakassi Boys vigilante group of south-eastern Nigeria. Based on extensive fieldwork among the shoe producers of Aba who originally formed the Bakassi Boys in 1998, this article traces the process through which popular security arrangements were developed and subsequently hijacked by opportunistic political officials engaged in power struggles between the State and Federal governments. Detailing the strategies and struggles involved in the process of political hijack, this inside account of the Bakassi Boys reveals the underlying resiliance of civil notions of justice and public accountability in contemporary Africa. By focusing on the violent outcomes of such vigilante groups, contemporary analyses of African civil society tend to overlook the struggles, and the vulnerability, of the civil initiatives of the powerless in a context of liberalization, institutional chaos and political opportunism.

Paper long abstract

Co-author: Insa Nolte, Centre of West African Studies, Birmingham

In response to the deepening crisis of the Nigerian state and the increasing economic and political marginalisation of Yoruba-speakers during the 1990s, the nature of Yoruba political nationalism has changed. The subsequent radicalisation of popular attitudes led to growing support for the occasionally violent activities of the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC), which continues to play an important role in the politics of western Nigeria. Beyond the political sphere, the transformation of Yoruba nationalism has also affected the internal relationships of the Yoruba nation. While Yoruba nationalism was associated with Christianity and formal education in the past, recent support for ethno-nationalist politics has grown especially among Muslims and the educationally disadvantaged.

The transformation of Yoruba nationalism reflects on a number of complex changes that are linked to the rise of the OPC. Thus, the OPC is an active agent of cultural homogenization. Although the OPC relies strongly on local traditional institutions, its revalidation of the cultural contributes to a more generalized pan-Yoruba practice. The OPC's revalidation of Yoruba cultural practice, however, does not hold widespread appeal to the educated elite, and it is opposed for spiritual reasons especially by Pentecostal Christians. This constellation has enabled Muslims and members of lower educational standing to take on leading positions within the OPC.

While the increased support of and participation into Yoruba nationalist politics by Muslims and the less educated reflects cultural work, it is also an indication of the nature of political and economic exclusion within the Nigerian state. Since the return to civilian rule under a Yoruba-speaking president in 1999, Yoruba-speakers have been able to rejoin national patronage networks. However, although the inclusion of regional elites into the national political economy has raised public perceptions of the value of being Yoruba, the life chances for many disadvantaged Yoruba-speakers - many of whom are Muslim and have had few chances to obtain a formal education - have not measurably improved. Thus, the OPC's success implies critique of social exclusion in Nigeria which constitutes the ethnic nation as a potential locus of a social reform of the state.