Paper long abstract

This paper presents analysis from field research on the precipitation of conflict in Darfur in 2002-03, and the influence of the IGAD peace process on the nature and timing of conflict. It critiques the approach of the international community to fostering peace in Sudan and concludes by reflecting on implications of the Darfur/IGAD interrelation on current peace-making and conflict dynamics in Sudan (in particular the DPA and the East).

International actors supporting the IGAD process adopted a north-south definition of the Sudan 'problem' and an exclusive approach to the negotiation, both for reasons of expediency and misdiagnosis. This weakness was exacerbated by a failure to adapt the 'sequenced' approach or to employ complementary mechanisms to mitigate unintended consequences of IGAD as politics and power relations shifted and stirred other crises. These consequences were predictable and probable on a proper analysis of the interlocking nature of grievance and conflict in Sudan.

Beyond the historic and incremental build-up of crisis within Darfur, research findings indicate external interconnections and linkages played a significant role in determining the timing, nature and direction of the conflict. The crisis in the Islamist project following the al-Turabi and Bashir split contributed significantly to increased political violence in Darfur and the emergence of the DLF (later SLA) and the JEM. The SLA/M and JEM in turn looked to developments in IGAD as both inspiration for the possible benefits of armed struggle, as well as a danger should they not claim a share.

The SPLA/M (above a longstanding interest in mobilising Darfuri rebellion) saw opportunity to re-assert its New Sudan position (undermined in Machakos) as it negotiated in IGAD, and thus it contributed in material ways to the organisation and mobilisation of the SLA/M. The disproportionately heavy military response of the Sudanese Government also linked back to the IGAD context, as it was both incited to prevent further erosion of its power and shielded from sanction owing to its ability to leverage the IGAD process. At the same time, the Darfur conflict was aggravated by downplaying, deferral and de-linking by international actors concerned not to derail IGAD negotiations. All this may be understood as the problematic political economy of peace-making in Sudan.

Paper long abstract

The Abyei Area, straddling the north-south border of Sudan, was the subject of a separate protocol in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the government and the SPLM in January 2005. One provision of that protocol was the establishment of a boundaries commission to define the territory to be included in the special administration of the area. The commission's decision was to be implemented 'with immediate effect' on the submission of its report in July 2005, but up to now implementation has been blocked by the National Congress Party, who still control the government in Sudan. The conduct of war in Abyei established many precedents for the conduct of war in Darfur in the use of tribal militias and the forcible displacement of non-Arab peoples. The failure to implement the Abyei Protocol has implications not only for determining the north-south border (as stipulated by the CPA), but for the implementation of the more recent Darfur peace agreement. This paper will examine those implications.

Paper long abstract

Much of the discussion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement has focussed on its high-level political and economic implications. This paper instead explores some of the more popular concerns expressed in Yei, Juba and Rumbek about the nature of post-conflict government, and the future of peace. Symbolic themes of blood, money and guns remain prominent, as highlighted earlier by Hutchinson (1996). The wartime perpetuated or hardened the distinction between the military/government and the 'people' or rural communities; at the same time it saw the spread of new ideas and expectations about the role of government in providing 'development' and the long-promised 'peace dividend'. The result now is deep mistrust of government and increasing expressions of frustration and disappointment. Although Southern politicians and government employees have historically been suspected of accepting 'bribes', there is a sense that there is an unprecedented degree of corruption surrounding 'the money' now. The perception is that everyone, from ministers to court judges and customs officials, is out to get rich quick, quite literally from the blood of the people, before the 'peace' ends. 'Money before people' would appear to sum up the ethos of this interim 'resting time', with little hope that either their own leaders, with their self-interest and perceived ethnic biases, or the Khartoum government with all its tricks, will really allow peace to last. Local and indigenous forms of authority are more trusted to put people first, but the war and the influx of guns into civilian hands are seen to have taken local/ethnic conflicts beyond their capacity to resolve. Government alone is seen to have the power, but not the intention of solving the problems created by its own military impact on the rural areas. And the questions of reward for sacrifices, and whose blood was spilt to 'liberate', and indeed who or what has been liberated, are becoming increasingly bitter and divisive.

Paper long abstract

This paper examines the role of oil in the civil war and the peace process, and outlines the behaviour of international oil companies in southern Sudan over the past thirty years. In the context of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and increasing independence for the south, Western oil companies are now forging new alliances with the southern Sudanese authorities and hoping to press ahead with exploration and extraction. What are the opportunities and threats posed by this situation for the people of southern Sudan?