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- Convenors:
-
Marieke van Winden (conference organiser)
(African Studies Centre Leiden)
Chibuike Uche (Leiden University)
Abel Ezeoha (Alex Ekwueme Federal University)
Solomon Zori (Rotterdam School of Management)
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- Stream:
- D: Cases of regional and disciplinary specifics
- Start time:
- 25 January, 2021 at
Time zone: Europe/Amsterdam
- Session slots:
- 1
Long Abstract:
By far the most important set of disciplines for the understanding of African studies in the global context is economics, finance and business. This is arguably because Western economic and business interests were the main drivers of colonization. The adoption of Western-style Companies Acts across the continent however has resulted in the mass de-legitimization of several indigenous businesses. The essence of this session will be to examine the African business, economic and finance space in the context of the foreignness of applicable theories, principles, and practices. Case studies, theoretical, and empirical papers that address the following questions are especially welcome: How do Western theories fare in explaining the specificities of economic and business engagements in Africa? What is the role of international regulatory standards in the dilated exclusivity and informality in Africa’s business and finance practices? Does being foreign mean differently for African multinationals operating in Africa? How have African businesses exploited the specificities of their local environment to compete with international businesses in the African business space? What forces have in recent times shaped the practices of African regional organizations and how have these impacted on businesses in Africa?
Accepted papers:
Session 1Paper long abstract:
ECOWAS member countries have been negotiating for common single currency for over 30 years. Practically, theses negotiations has been between the 'French' West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) bloc that uses the CFA franc currency as common currency and the 'English' West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) bloc that still uses its respective different national currencies (Naire, Cedi, Liberian Dollar, Leone, Dalasi). Proponents, believe that a functional single currency for ECOWAS region will not only facilitate trade, payment and lower transaction costs amongst its 400 million people but will especially provide a more robust resistance to intermittent external international monetary shocks and disruptions. Its original planned launch date of January 1st 2004 has been postponed repeatedly (to 2005, 2010, 2014 and 2020) largely due to the inability of member states to meet up with the convergence criteria set out as precondition for establishing the common currency monetary union and qualifying for membership.
However, the sudden and unilateral announcement by France and the WAEMU bloc in December 2019 to retire the CFA franc in 2020 and replaced it with a new currency - called the Eco, (which will still be pegged to the Euro and guaranteed by France) can only make sense when it is conceived as a mutually beneficial political move. The symbolic planned scraping of the CFA franc for the Eco may be seen as efforts being made by governments of CFA franc monetary zone to shed its colonial vestiges from France and amongst other political elections interests serve to calm the current anti-french sentiment on the rise in 'french' West Africa. The swift rejection and strong condemnation of the move by the WAMZ bloc may have significantly compromise the future and prospect of Eco as the ECOWAS regional bloc single currency.
This paper explores the emerging contestations between the two blocs over the issue of adopting single common currency as a new arena for colonial scramble of West Africa between France and post-Brexit Britain. While France is seeking to reposition, consolidate and possibly expand its influence and economic interest in West Africa, it is clear that pro-Brexit government in Britain is desperately betting its future on re-energising and increasing economic and political ties with Commonwealth member states of which includes the WAMZ bloc within ECOWAS.
Paper short abstract:
During Jacob Zuma's presidency in South Africa, 2009-2018, he and other ANC actors crafted narratives from cultural, religious and ideological discourses. In conjunction with political contests, they reshaped the meaningful markets and rules of the game in the political economy .
Paper long abstract:
Neoliberal frameworks of politically and culturally disembedded markets dominate among Western political risk analysts for business. So does an implicit strict dichotomy between states and markets. This paper explores whether and how diverse narratives from cultural, religious and ideological discourses co-constituted markets during Jacob Zuma's presidency in South Africa, 2009-2018.
The narratives of Zuma and his supporters in the ruling African National Congress (ANC) were crafted for political and business ends from discourses involving a revisionist and anti-imperialist international order, a state-led National Democratic Revolution, racially-tinged nation-building, nativism, appeals to Christianity and African traditional religion and custom, socio-economic redistribution and the decolonization of universities.
The narratives were endogeneous to competition, coopetition and cooperation between domestic intra-party elites, inter-party elites and foreign political and business elites in a hybrid regime. In interaction with political forces and events, they shaped the institutional rules of the game, the horizons of intelligibility, the position of some actors, and the symbolic frameworks of entrepeneurship, production, market participation and consumption. They also shaped local and international processes related to labour, the allocation of profits and resources, and investor and property rights. In this sense, markets were full of contested meaning and meaning-making.
The narratives and patronage politics under Zuma helped the ANC to maintain one-party dominance in South Africa. However, the weaker state capabilities and socio-economic value destruction during Zuma's presidency created discursive and structural opportunities and incentives for decentralization and self-help initiatives. A more multipolar order is emerging. Whether decentralization and self-help initiatives will become discursively coupled to decolonization, remains to be seen. Compared to the first five years of ANC rule under Nelson Mandela (1994-1999), the interaction between discourses, agents and structures under Zuma (2009-2018) significantly reshaped the meaningful markets and rules of the game in the political economy.
Paper short abstract:
Our paper shows that the strength of the home (rather than host) country institutions is capable of deterring foreign MNCs from a choice of environmental unfriendly modes of production; and for local MNCs, the quality of home country institutions and political patronage are greater influencer.
Paper long abstract:
By the proposition of the pollution heaven hypothesis, foreign MNCs operating in developing countries are greater emitters of CO2 than their local counterparts. They expectedly move their operations from countries of stringent regulations and institutional standards to those with weak institutional settings. Using the case of Dangote Cement and Lafarge Africa in Nigeria, the strength of the home (rather than host) country institutions is capable of deterring foreign MNCs from a choice of environmental unfriendly modes of production. For local MNCs, we find that the quality of home country institutions and political patronage play key role in their choice of modus of operations. In such institutionally weak jurisdictions like Nigeria, local MNCs think more in terms of finding cheaper rather than more environmentally friendly and sustainable ways of production. In doing this, they strategically engage in CSR activities that offer them government protections and shift public attention from their consequent negative externalities.
Paper long abstract:
This study examines the economic consequences of mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) from firm level perspective, and across country classification (developing versus developed economy). Using a global sample of firms from 40 / 45 countries spanning over two decades from 1993-2016, and applying difference-in- differences design, we analyze the induced changes in the cost of equity / debt capital following IFRS adoption. We find that mandatory adopters in developing countries are not more likely to experience significant decreases in the cost of equity in the post-adoption period than firms in developed countries. Even more important, in neither country group mandatory adopters show an advantage over non-adopters from our control group, meaning that IFRS adoption does not have a positive effect on cost of equity capital. However, for cost of debt we identify an advantage of mandatory adopters over non-adopters in developing as well as in developed countries. At the same time, firms in developed countries show a larger decrease in the cost of debt than firms in developing countries. Furthermore, as an additional analysis we examine the impact of IFRS adoption on cost of equity under consideration of a country's institutional settings and its shareholder protection regime. In line with prior literature we find that IFRS adoption seems more beneficial when a country exhibits high governance quality, which accounts for both country groups. However, regarding shareholder protection our findings are twofold. In developed countries IFRS adoption seems most beneficial to firms which are located in strong shareholder protection regimes, whereas in developing countries the opposite is the case. Overall, our findings suggest that mandatory IFRS adoption does not necessarily come along with economic benefits and should be considered when promoting the worldwide introduction of IFRS, especially in developing countries.