Paper short abstract:

This article offers an original analysis of Central Asia’s engagement with China, framed by the theory of ‘hedging’ and enriched by granular analyses of individual Central Asian countries, which are supportive of the BRI but have also selectively resisted a deepening of relations with China.

Paper long abstract:

Central Asia is a key pillar of China’s ‘belt and road initiative’ (BRI) and in particular the overland portion known as the ‘silk road economic belt’ (SREB). Although the region’s leaders are supportive of the SREB, they have occasionally and selectively resisted a deepening of their asymmetrical relations with China. Building upon a theoretically-driven foreign policy approach known as ‘hedging’, this article suggests that hedging arises not just from structural and exogenous conditions but is also facilitated by endogenous considerations within Central Asian states. In distinguishing between the region’s ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ hedgers, the article also analyses the determinants of success or failure of hedging. This article argues that some Central Asian states possess the resources and capabilities to exercise agency vis-à-vis their relations with China more often than is generally recognised in the extant literature. These states have and will continue to pose challenges to the SREB and to the development of Central Asia–China relations more generally. What resources are available to them, which tool of statecraft they deploy, and how effective these efforts are comprise focusing questions in our research. Ultimately, this article argues that the ability of leaders in Central Asia to selectively manage, balance, bandwagon, and negotiate their relations with China is a significant, but often under-appreciated, part of the narrative about Central Asia–China relations. Central Asian countries are not the equals of China, but neither are they mere policy-takers.