Paper short abstract:

This paper reviews the anthropological and psychological literature on Theory of Mind (ToM) and autism spectrum disorders, posing questions about whether ToM is a Western "folk" category, and whether it exists on a continuum among both neurodiverse and neurotypical communities.

Paper long abstract:

In the mid-1980s, Simon Baron-Cohen hypothesized that children with autism lack Theory of Mind (ToM) or the capacity to perceive what other people think, feel and believe. Concomitant with this “mindblindness,” Baron-Cohen argued that autistic individuals are unable to experience empathy, which he identified as a quintessential characteristic of being fully human. Autistic self-advocates reject Baron-Cohen’s claims, and researchers have documented individuals diagnosed with autism who demonstrate the ability to empathize with or take the perspective of others. Nonetheless, the association between autism and absence of ToM remains influential: in 2020, the trial of a mass-murderer in Toronto hinged on the defense’s claim that due to autism, he was unable emotionally to recognize the harm his actions caused and hence should not be held criminally responsible. This paper analyses the discourse of the defense, and the critiques levelled at it by the autistic community. The paper also takes stock of the contemporary anthropological and psychological research on ToM as it relates to autism, and poses these questions:

• Is ToM a Western idea or product of Western “folk psychology” rather than a universal human conception, as Baron-Cohen has suggested?

• Does ToM exist on a continuum such that both individuals diagnosed with autism and those without a diagnosis might demonstrate “giftedness” and/or challenges with respect to their capacity for taking the perspective of others?

• If ToM exists on a continuum, what are the implications for blurring the boundaries between diagnostic categories, and between classifications of neurodiverse and neurotypical?