

Natural resource extraction and indigenous contentious action in Bolivia¹

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Abstract:

Under what conditions does natural resource exploitation lead to contentious mobilization of ethnic minorities and can contentious collective action be mitigated by (more) participatory governance measures such as prior consultation of local people?

Based on extensive semi-structured interviews and two workshops realized with indigenous representatives and organizations the paper tries to answer these questions by conducting micro-level analyses of three local cases of indigenous lowland minorities in Bolivia.

Using social movement theory approaches and more recent literature on the so-called resource-curse, comparative results indicate that apart from local organizational structures especially the broader dynamics of state appropriation of the local arena, as well as issues of land distribution/scarcity matter for explaining the mobilization effect of indigenous minorities in gas extraction areas: resource extraction seems to shape the local perception of the overall range of authority of the central state.

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I. Introduction

According to the literature on civil conflict, natural resources – especially high-value resources – might under certain circumstances foster ethnic contentious mobilization and (violent) conflicts. This is a topic of growing relevance, not least in Latin America, where an increasing trend of new extractivism or “extractive boom” (Bebbington 2012, p. 4) has been observed by several authors.

Thus, taking the example of Bolivia gas meanwhile present the most important export commodity, accounting for 46 percent of the total national exports as of 2012 (UN Comtrade). The increase in gas extraction generates local risks and partly also contentious collective action – especially among indigenous lowland minorities such as Guaraníes and Weenhayek.

While recently several authors have begun to analyze the presented topic more in detail, it still remains contested how the mechanisms linking natural resources extraction and contention work in detail and how the driving forces of contentious collective action can be mitigated.

To shed additional light on the interaction of natural resource extraction and contentious mobilization of ethnic minorities the present paper compares two local cases of Guaraní TCOs²/communities in the department of Tarija and Chuquisaca (one case of mobilization and one, which is marked by the absence of mobilization), and of a Chiquitano TCO in Santa Cruz using new original data collected during field research in Bolivia in 2013.

The underlying central research questions are: To which extend and under which contextual conditions does gas extraction drive contentious collective action of indigenous minorities – or not?

Although this is certainly no unprecedented question, my paper makes several novel and innovative contributions to the existing literature. First, while the more general literature on the resource-conflict-link has mainly focused on violent conflicts or civil war, little attention has so far been paid to low- or non-violent contentious collective action. Moreover, methodologically within social movement research the principal focus use to be on cases of high mobilization but

² TCO = Indigenous collective land.

not on outliers or not “non-mobilization” (with the exception of Mc Adam et al., 2010; McAdam and Boudet, 2012), this is partly also true for the country specific literature. The comparison to a “non-mobilization case”, realized in this paper, has the potential to provide valuable insights, however, and can serve for the testing of tentative findings. The paper furthermore puts special focus on the further unpacking of the relation state – indigenous minorities and the question of how this relation is changed by natural resource extraction (for more details see below). Finally, my paper is based on the evaluation of new comprehensive data, which I gathered during field research in Bolivia in 2013.

II. Literature review

Why and how should natural resource exploitation lead to (more) contentious mobilization of ethnic minorities?

Within the more general literature on ethnic or indigenous contentious collective action the so called “grievance”-approach use to underline the importance of (perceived) political inequalities or socio-economic exclusion that coincide with ethnic cleavages, and thus may facilitate mobilization for conflict (Wimmer, Cederman & Min, 2009; Esteban, Mayoral, & Ray, 2012; Østby, 2008).

The political opportunity approach, on the other hand, shifts its focus on the influence of specific political structures that enable or inhibit ethnic contention and conflict. Thus, several studies have highlighted the importance of particular (changing) institutional and legal arrangements for the dynamics of ethnic contentious politics and further mobilization (Tarrow, 1994; Wilkinson, 2004; for the Latin American context van Cott, 2000; 2005; Yashar, 2005).

Other authors have quite rightly pointed out, that organizational resources (funding and further material resources, leadership capacity, international support etc.) are a further indispensable factor for mobilization capacity of ethnic and other social groups (McCarthy and Zald, 1973; McAdam et al, 2010).

Although the relative importance of the particular explanatory factors is highly contested as well as their specific interplay, most authors do agree that it is not ethnicity per se, which drives

contentious collective action but its complex interaction with different contextual factors. One of these factors, which due to its increasing practical worldwide relevance should receive special interest, is the extraction of natural resources – especially of high-value resources such as oil and gas.

While there are already numerous studies concerning the impact of natural resource extraction on violent conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Ross 2006; 2012; Le Billon 2001), most of these analysis use only highly aggregated measures for operationalizing explanatory factors and are unable to comprehensively study the interaction of different aspects of ethnicity and natural resource extraction; moreover, they hardly consider rather low- or non-violent contention.³

Turning to the country specific literature on Bolivia and literature on the overall Andean region at least more recently there can, in contrast, be found several more detailed analysis of the interaction of indigenous contentious action and natural resource extraction.

The most comprehensive study probably is the edited volume by Anthony Bebbington and Jeffrey Bury (2013), which includes various country case studies of resource extraction and related social mobilization in Latin America. Using political ecology approaches the authors in the concluding comparative chapter resume the major importance of “uncertainty and dispossession” (ibid, p.246) – mainly concerning land and water resources in the context of unequal opportunities with regard to the benefits of resource production (ibid., p. 254) as driving factors of social (often indigenous) contentious mobilization against resource extraction.

Focussing on the Bolivia, a study of Perrault (2008) analyzes the impacts of natural gas extraction on the Guaraní community of Cumandaroti, in the TCO of Itika Guasu in the department Tarija. He finds that particularly grievances such as water and air pollution, and the lack of adequate prior consultation have triggered local protests against the gas activities.

³ Within social movement theory only lately some authors began to examine, for example, the specific impact of large infrastructure projects, such as liquefied natural gas terminals (Boudet, 2010; Mc Adam et al., 2010), but yet without comprehensively considering the interactive impact of ethnic identities.

Humphreys Bebbington (2012), also analyzing the case of gas production in the area of the Guarani people TCO Itika Guasu, as well as of the Weenhayek people in the Gran Chaco, concludes that inequality with regard to access to political decision making, to information and to economic opportunity between local indigenous groups and other stakeholders (and sometimes also between different indigenous groups) is the main source of tension and social conflict in the context of gas extraction.

McNeish's (2013) article on the conflict over TIPNIS underlines the conflict promoting factors of the omitting of prior consultation by the state, and historically grounded tensions related to land/territory and identity (ibid., p. 237), but also stresses the heterogeneity of indigenous identities and interests, which exacerbates the determination of coherent explanatory factors.

To sum up, these illuminative micro-level case studies provide at least tentative findings about why and more precisely how natural resource exploitation leads to contentious mobilization of ethnic minorities.

III. Natural resource extraction, local contentious action and the role of the state

Adding on the presented qualitative case studies on Bolivia and the Andean region, as well as the more recent quantitative studies on violent conflict on the interaction of natural resources with different dimensions of ethnicity, I argue natural resource extraction should be an important driver of contentious collective action of ethnic minorities. While several studies have begun to dismantle the mechanisms about how this works, results are far from being conclusive and deserve further analysis. Thus, the present paper wants to make two central novel contributions to the existing literature: one is methodological and will be outlined in section IV. Second, with regard to the analysis of potential explanatory factors the paper puts special focus on the further unpacking of the relation state – indigenous minorities and the question of how this relation is changed by natural resource extraction, something which has rarely been done in detail so far.

In Bolivia, as in many other oil and gas exporting countries, the state in form of the central government is – at least since the so-called “nationalization” of the hydrocarbon sector in 2006

– of central importance within the natural resources extraction process. As Bebbington and Bury (2013) points out, it is at the same time “a directly interested party” – generally in the expansion of resource extraction – and a “terrain of struggle” (ibid., p. 282). This is especially determinative as the regions, in which gas is exploited, are often rather peripheral, rural regions, where before there had been rather little state presence at all. The increased interest and presence of (agencies of) the central state can, on the one hand, drive competition of power between local – ethnic/indigenous and other – elites, which may lead to contention as Hunziker and Cederman (2012) have argued. On the other hand, it can more generally change the perspective on, and the attitude of the local population towards the central state. It might be considered as an intruder, which is directly associated with the new uncertainties and threats in the context of natural resource extraction. This is especially true for rural indigenous minority groups such as in the Bolivian case for example the Guaraní or Weenhayek due to their high(er) dependency on agricultural activities, and the often stronger bond to their homeland. The changing relationship with the central state may finally be characterized by new expectations on revenue transfers from resource rents that, if not adequately fulfilled, may provoke rising tensions.

This theoretically-deduced argument on the changed relationship between central state and indigenous minorities through resource extraction shall be tested within a comparison of three local case studies in Bolivia. As I do, however, not assume that the dynamics of local contentious action are solely influenced through this causal mechanism, I will also analyze the importance and interaction of several other factors, which are usually cited in social movement theory as typical explanatory factors. These factors are, first and foremost, organizational structures and the role of leadership within the particular local indigenous organizations (see Zald and McCarthy, 1987). Secondly, I will have a closer look at the specific risks (or “threats”, see McAdam and Boudet, 2012) related to resource extraction as perceived by the local indigenous communities and will compare them to the central problems named in the case of communities without gas extraction. Finally, previous local oppositional experiences might also be of relevance for explaining higher levels of contentious mobilization (McAdam and Boudet, 2012; for violent conflict see Dixon, 2009).

While the testing of the illustrated explanatory factors is at first a deductive approach, it will be complemented by an inductive proceeding of exploratively searching for additional or alternative explanatory factors and causal mechanisms via a content analysis of the interviews conducted during field research to conceive important insights, which might have been neglected within my conceptual framework.

IV. Research design (and case selection)

To address the research question outlined above I engage in a qualitative small N-comparison (Sartori, 1991) of three local cases of indigenous minorities in Bolivia.

Case selection of the local sides is based on a quantitative disaggregated analysis of local conflict events in Bolivia at the provincial level, through which me and a colleague of mine sustained the conflict promoting impact of the interaction of gas extraction and indigenous contentious collective action (Mähler and Pierskalla, unpublished).⁴ The central case is a case to verify and further elaborate (or refute) my argument, and should thus be characterized by gas extraction and a (comparatively) high level of contentious collective action of indigenous minority groups. The second one is conceptualized as an outlier case, where gas is exploited, but still there is a rather low level of contention of indigenous minorities. This case should be used to study, which of the factors usually triggering contention about resource extraction is absent (or which of these factors is mitigated by counter measures). The third case, finally, is a case without gas extraction and again a low level of contention of indigenous minority groups. It serves for analyzing if the absence of contention can actually be explained by the absence of gas extraction or might be due to further explanatory factors, and thus presents a further verification and validation of the findings of the paper.

A further criterion for picking out specific local communities, for realizing interviews has been accessibility, most notably in the context of establishing contact to local NGOs. This obviously implies biases concerning my case selection and limits the possibilities of generalization of my

⁴ Both studies are part of the DFG-financed research project “A Dangerous Liaison? Ethnicity, Natural Resources and Civil Conflict Onset” headed by Dr. Matthias Basedau of the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies in Hamburg, Germany.

results - something, which is however a common limitation of single case studies and qualitative comparisons.

My first case hence is that of the TCO Yaku Igua of the Guaraní people in the province Gran Chaco (department of Tarija), which represents 18 Guaraní communities (2321 people according to Fundación Tierra, 2010). My analysis especially – although not exclusively – focuses on the conflicts surrounding the construction of the gas plant "Planta de Separación de Líquidos de Gran Chaco". The planning and construction (2011-today) of the plant has been accompanied by protests, blockages and other campaigns of the APG⁵ Yaku Igua in the context of, firstly, the government refusal to realize a prior consultation, and secondly, controversial discussions about issues of mitigation and compensation.

The second case is that of the Guaraní TCO Zona Machareti (2015 people according to Fundación Tierra, 2010) in the department of Chuquisaca.⁶ I laid a special focus on a project of seismic studies ("sísmica 3D de Huacaya") proceeding new gas exploitations, which has initiated in early 2013 in the province of Luis Calvo, and which centrally impacted the Guaraní people of the This case has been characterized by an almost absence of mobilizations against the new gas exploiting activities. According to you previous conflict analysis the comparatively low level of contention also holds true for the TCO Machareti more generally speaking when considering the period of time since the year 2000 (Mähler and Pierskalla, unpublished).

The third "case"⁷ is that of several Chiquitano communities and representatives of the OICH, the *Indigenous Organization of the Chiquitanos*, all from the province of José Miguel de Velasco (department of Santa Cruz), where no gas is exploited and where according to our previous extensive conflict analysis there is a low level of local contentious collective action.

To comprehensively study my local cases, I used several sources and methods: I mainly combined the analysis of governmental documents and so-called grey-literature of local NGOs with the analysis and interpretation of novel data collected during field research from April to May, and July to August 2013. During this time realized semi-structured interviews with

⁵ APG = *Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní*, which is the central representation of the Guaraní people.

⁶ The project also has impact on the Guaraní TCO of Tentayapi but I didn't have the possibility to get in contact with representatives of this TCO.

⁷ Which – due to the absence of a specific gas project – is harder to define concretely.

indigenous *comunitarios* and local indigenous representatives of the APG, CCCH and the OICH; moreover, I conducted small-scale (not representative!) surveys⁸, and additionally discussed the topic of gas extraction in two workshops with Guaraní representatives and community members in Yacuiba and Monteagudo.

My interview corpus consists of altogether about 80 interviews and surveys more or less evenly distributed among the three cases.⁹ In all cases I tried to capture an approximately balanced distribution of gender of my interview partners and spoke to younger as well as senior people to provide a better representation of the (potential) heterogeneity of the positions and to make sure that the samples could be compared over the cases. The surveys additionally were used to verify my previous information on the existence (absence) of local contention.

The two workshops consisted, on the one hand, of a workshop with the APG Yaku Igua, during which the concerns about the new gas plant, but also more general local impacts of gas extraction, and the perception of the resource politics of the government of Evo Morales were discussed. Participants were local representatives of the APG Yaku Igua and further Guaraní community members (about 60 people).

During the other workshop¹⁰ with the CCCH (*Guaraní Consejo de Capitanes de Chuquisaca*) in Monteagudo, the discussion mainly focused on the mentioned project of seismic studies (“sísmica 3D de Huacaya”) with some allusion to the local impacts of gas extraction in general. Participants were local representatives of the CCCH and further *comunitarios* of Guaraní communities of the TCO Machareti and Ingre (about 25-30 people).

The interviews and workshop recordings have been transcribed and are used to realize quantitative and qualitative content analyses (Merten, 1983). The key themes of the interviews

⁸ These surveys consisted of a mixture of open-ended and mostly close-ended questions; selection of the respondents has not been randomized – this together with the small number of surveys that have been conducted limits the validity of the survey results.

⁹ However, in the case of Chuquisaca I was not able to additionally visit a local community in the neighbourhood of the new seismic project of Huacaya.

¹⁰ In this context I want to thank you very much Mr. Ramiro Molina Barrios of the University of Católica de La Paz and Fadhila Mammar for their support!

have been 1.) central problems of the local communities (in general not only related to gas extraction, 2.) perspectives/opinions of gas exploitation¹¹, 3.) attitude towards the state and the government of Evo Morales in particular, 4.) perception and evaluation of the internal structuration and strength of the respective indigenous.

With respect to the attitudes towards the state/government I have begun to conduct a more detailed inductive qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2000), in the form of a condensation of the contents and an assignment of categories, to detect and compare actor specific perceptions of and attitudes towards particular themes. This more detailed content analysis has, however, not yet been entirely completed (!).

V. Preliminary results and discussion

After a preliminary comparative analysis of the three cases it can be concluded that issues of land distribution seem to be a central factor driving contentious collective action. While this aspect is named as a central problem in the surveys and interviews in the case of Yaku Igua, it is of much less importance for the respondents in the TCO Machareti, and still less in the Chiquitanía. This difference can also be confirmed by comparing secondary information about the different cases: while the TCO Yaku Igua faces major opposition and thus uncertainties concerning the recognition of its territory, the TCO Machareti and the TCO *Guarasugwe Chiquitano del Bajo Paragua* in the Chiquitanía have already been entitled with substantial parts of the demanded ancestral territory.

When during the interviews asked for related problems several Chiquitano community members of the province Miguel de Velasco actually explicitly negated the existence of land scarcity or disputes over land distribution. In contrast, when asked for the most serious impacts of gas extraction in the Gran Chaco, a former APG leader told me that above all gas extraction is taking away and reducing remaining land (“territorio”)¹²; while land scarcity is apparently partly

¹¹ More specific questions on that topic in the cases of Monteagudo (Chuquisaca) and Yaku Igua (Tarija).

¹² : “También se está construyendo la planta separadora de líquidos aquí en el Chaco. La parte negativa es el aspecto de manera territorial [...]. Nos quita el territorio ¿no? nos reduce nuestro territorio ...”(interview at the 12th of August 2013, Villa Montes).

existing independently from gas, this issue may be exacerbated by gas extraction – as underlined in this proposition.

Moreover, the state (or central government) in this context presents a direct opponent, who is provoking, or at least aggravating, issues of the scarcity of land, as it is pointed out in the discourse a an APG leader, who repeatedly accused the government of guaranteeing private property but not property communitarian of indigenous people.¹³

The finding of the importance of land scarcity, aggravated by resource extraction, as a central factor of driving contentious collective action, confirms insights of other local case studies (see for example Bebbington et al., 2013). While this issue is one the hand connected with broader aspects of (minority) rights and power struggles, some evidences of my inquiries indicate that it might also be connected to a further explanatory factor, which is increased unemployment due to the limitation of previous agricultural activities by new hydrocarbon extraction. The oil and gas does generally not provide many job alternatives for the local indigenous population but in contrast rather increases (perceived) disparities. This can be illustrated by the statement of a community member during the workshop discussion with the TCO Yaku Igua:

Las empresas que vienen aquí, lo primero que hacen es contratar a otras personas de afuera y no a las personas que son de aquí, es por eso que los comunarios de la zona pelean mucho para poder entrar a esta empresa. (16th of August 2013).

Moreover, the problem of unemployment also ranked much higher in my surveys completed in the TCO Yaku Igua than in the two other cases (when in general asked for the central problems of the local communities).

As indicated above one of the special interests of my study has been to analyse how the relation state – indigenous communities might be altered by gas extraction. Although I have not yet entirely completed the more detailed content analysis, there are some interesting observations

¹³ He said: “... ¿realmente el Estado reconoce, protege y garantiza el tema de la propiedad colectiva y comunitaria?, ¿de a dónde?, yo me pregunto eso y aquí los compañeros me van a decir ahorita, donde hicieron todo ¿no?, garantiza la propiedad privada, no la comunitaria, garantiza la propiedad individual también, del campesinado, pero no de los comunarios ...” (workshop with the APG Yakua Igua, 16th of August 2013).

to be outlined: firstly, the interviewees in the non-gas extraction are of the Chiquitanía simply made much less allusions (whether negative or positive) to the state and its agencies, which might point towards less presence of the state in this region – in everyday practical life but also with reference to experience realm. Second, when directly asked (in surveys and interviews) if the central government discriminates the Guaraní/Chiquitanos, in the case of the TCO Yaku Igua all my respondents markedly affirmed a discrimination of the Guaraní people, while answers were much more diverse in the case of the interviewed Chiquitanos – but interestingly also in the TCO Machareti.¹⁴

Having in mind the specific case of the latest hydrocarbon projects in the TCO Yaku Igua and Machareti the different perspectives might apparently be influenced by the implementation – or in the case of the Gran Chaco gas plant in the TCO Yaku Igua – the non-implementation of the prior consultation of the local indigenous people.¹⁵ But the answers and perception of a discrimination by the government goes far beyond this single point of issue of the consultation and is referred to most different situations of daily life.¹⁶ A related motive commonly repeated in the discourse of the respondents in the case of Yaku Igua was that of the “incumplimiento” (non-compliance) of the government, which seems to indicate a greater disappointment with regard to expectations created by the government of Evo Morales, which might not least have arisen due to state let gas extraction. In this context it has also been salient, that for example the absence of gas connection in the communities¹⁷ has rarely been an issue during my interviews in the Chiquitanía, but was a frequently stressed aspect in the two other cases,

¹⁴ At the same time, it can be amended that the communities, which I visited, have all been characterized by rather similar indigence and a lack of infrastructure endowment.

¹⁵ The right of prior consultation of local indigenous peoples and peasant communities concerning hydrocarbon activities has been conceded by the Bolivian government since the promulgation of the Supreme Decree (SD) 29033 in 2007 respectively its precursor, the Hydrocarbons Law 3058 of 2005 (for more details, Schilling-Vacaflor, 2013). The Bolivian right of prior consultation, which has increasingly been criticized by several indigenous and other non-governmental organizations (see Pellegrini and Ribera Arismendi, 2012) is currently being reformed. In the current form it doesn't have to be applied for all new gas activities but depends on the particular classification of these projects, which is carried out by the state agencies.

¹⁶ Moreover, while there were carried out consultations in the case of the seismic studies (“sísmica 3D de Huacaya”) in the TCO Machareti, the way they were realized have been criticized by many indigenous representatives, but still there was no broader contentious collective action against the government.

¹⁷ Neither of the communities, which I visited, had gas connection.

where there are gas extracting activities, and thus the disparity is much more directly perceivable, and might rather seem to be a “discrimination” than purely “absence”.¹⁸

Given the above presented argument the questions remains, why there has been less contentious action in the case of the TCO Machareti? On the one hand, I already discussed the less severe situation with regard to land scarcity in this case. According to my findings, it is not only motive that matters, however. It is also organizational resources, which are of major impact. Thus, the comparatively weak organizational entrenchment of the *Consejo de Capitanías de Chuquisaca* (CCCH) – the Guaraní Assembly of the department of Chuquisaca, had been attested in the course of several expert interviews during field research.¹⁹

The specific impact of local leadership has, moreover, also been underlined during the workshop with members of the TCO Machareti, where participants brought forward the allegation of a lacking coordination between the central directory of the APG, the CCCH (departmental council of the Guaraní people of Chuquisaca) and the local capitanes or local Guaraní leaders with regard to the reactions of the seismic project of Huacaya, which impeded a more powerful response. Several participants criticized even more precisely the local authorities by saying that there has been no forceful positioning of these authorities.²⁰ Interviewees in the TCO Yaku Igua, in contrast, confirmed a high engagement APG zonal (APG Yaku Igua) as well as of the central directory of the APG.

Finally, one additional factor of potential explanatory relevance came up in the course of the analysis of my interviews: the issue of “servitude” or forced labor, which has, however, not yet been dismantled more comprehensively. According to various expert interviews cases of

¹⁸ See for example an interview in the TCO Yaku Igua, where the respondent said: “... aquí en la región del Chaco hay bastante petróleo y gas el pueblo Guaraní, la nación Guaraní en este caso los vivientes, las comunidades de donde esta saliendo el petróleo no se benefician pues de por lo menos de tener un gas domiciliario, no tiene gas...”. (12th of August 2014).

¹⁹ E.g. an interviews with Hernán Ruiz staff of the NGO JAINA in Tarija (8th of August, Yacuiba). NOT YET COMPLETED: more detailed analysis of the relationship of the directory of the APG and the APG councils of the departments of Chuquisaca and Tarija.

²⁰ Literally: “No existe un posicionamiento firme de las autoridades” (workshop in Monteagudo, 16th. July 2013).

servitudes of Guaraní people appears to have been more widespread in the Guaraní communities in Chuquisaca (or at least a more recent times). The topic has also been brought up much more often in interviews within indigenous communities in the department of Chuquisaca than in Tarija. Tentative reflections concerning this issue are: on the one hand, the aspect of more widespread and recent experiences might contribute to explain the less powerful organisational structures of the Guaraní councils in Chuquisaca. On the other hand, it might have contributed to increased gratitude towards the government of Evo Morales for changing these inhuman conditions and thus might also explain the less marked perception of discrimination by the current government (it has been salient that in several interviews in one Guaraní community in Chuquisaca, where the majority of inhabitants has formerly lived under conditions of forced labor, expressed a particularly positive appraisal towards the government).

To sum up, the preliminary results of my comparative case study indicate that albeit differences in contentious collective action by indigenous minorities cannot exclusively be explained with reference to the issues of gas extraction, still gas extraction is significantly driving local contention. This is taking place through complex, interacting mechanisms, whereby explanatory factors of major importance seem to be multiple new threats associated with resource extraction – perhaps most importantly exacerbated land scarcity. This aspect has on the one hand to be embedded into more general issues of minority rights and power struggles, and on the other hand may also be linked to the much more specific factor of unemployment in the context of limitations of previous agricultural activities. Moreover, beside the impact of new threats, the increased intrusion of agencies of the state through gas extraction activities also seems to change perspective on and expectations towards the state. Confronted with increased disparities in the context of resource extraction these expectations are easily disenchanted and instead powerful local frames of “discrimination” and “non-compliance” may emerge, which are fostering contention.

However, as the comparison of the cases of the TCO Yaku Igua and Machareti suggests, the presented interacting motives will have to be complemented by organizational resources,

concerning internal organization structures as well as aspects of leadership to actually lead to contentious collective action.

While I do not in the least intend to downplay the impact of prior consultation in the presented topic of resource extraction, the complexity of explanatory factors identified in this study may also challenge simplified conceptions of prior consultation as a simple remedy for resource related conflict.

As already indicated the capability of my study to discover general results is limited, due to its nature of a small-N comparison, nevertheless, it might at least serve to establish some novel hypothesis. Moreover, in future research with a colleague I hope to integrate further cases in the comparison. A final outstanding issue, which still will have to be addressed, are obviously conclusions of my findings with regard to future resource governance!

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