Paper short abstract:

Based on an analysis of China's National College Entrance Exam, this paper argues that state censorship is effective, but not for the reasons that many ordinarily assume. People in China suffer not so much from false consciousness, but from false confidence. They are cynical, but not cynical enough.

Paper long abstract:

Outside observers of China sometimes assume that media censorship and state propaganda result in the "brainwashing" of Chinese citizens. At least since the Lin Biao incident (1971), however, many in China have approached state pronouncements with a healthy dose of skepticism. Particularly in the post-Mao era of Reform and Opening (1978 to present), cynicism has become a dominant attitude of Chinese citizens toward state-sponsored information. At the same time, China seems to have undergone the kind of "performative shift" that characterized late Soviet society, and, increasingly, also characterizes late liberal societies (Yurchak/Boyer). But such concepts as "cynicism as ideology" (Žižek/Sloterdijk) or "performativity" (Yurchak/Austin) fail to capture the full complexity of Chinese state-society relations. Based on an analysis of state secrecy in the Chinese National College Entrance Examination, this paper argues that state censorship is effective, but not for the reasons that many ordinarily assume that it is. People in China suffer not so much from "false consciousness" but rather from false confidence. They are cynical, but perhaps not cynical enough. Simultaneously, they maintain a sincere belief in hard work, the family, true friendship, and the ultimate fairness of supernatural social arbiters such as fate and the gods. Meanwhile, state actors actively suppress data that would reveal the real extent of social inequality while producing a copious fog of statistical information that tells us little about what is actually going on. This pattern holds true in the realms of education, the environment, gender, and other areas.

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