Beyond simple incentives: how funding schemes shape data sharing behaviour
Thomas Klebel
(Know Center Research GmbH)
Tony Ross-Hellauer
(Know Center Research GmbH)
Flaminio Squazzoni
(University of Milan)
Short abstract
Using agent-based modelling, we show that competitive funding schemes paradoxically undermine long-term data sharing adoption. Neither large competitive grants nor small distributed funding alone can drive sustainable change without addressing the underlying costs of data sharing practices.
Long abstract
Policy makers increasingly mandate data sharing practices, yet we lack systematic evidence about the effectiveness of different implementation approaches. Using an agent-based model, we examine how funding schemes and incentive structures affect the uptake of data sharing practices among competing research teams.
Our simulations reveal a paradoxical relationship between competitive funding and data sharing: while highly competitive funding schemes with large grants can accelerate initial adoption, they lead to lower sharing rates in the long term. This occurs because the uncertainty associated with competitive funding negatively affects the cost-benefit ratio of data sharing for most teams. Conversely, more distributive funding schemes with smaller grants fail to provide teams with sufficient resources to absorb data sharing costs, also limiting uptake.
We find that without adequate support infrastructure to minimize costs, funding agencies alone are unlikely to drive sustainable adoption of data sharing practices.
The community structure of scientific fields further complicates this dynamic, with network effects generally dampening sharing rates compared to unconnected scenarios. Our findings suggest that attempts to reform reward systems toward open science principles must carefully consider the complex interplay between funding structures, incentives, and researchers' strategic adaptations.
In this talk, we examine in detail the critical roles of data sharing costs and cumulative advantage effects, with particular attention to how these factors can negatively impact sharing adoption. We conclude by critically examining how simulation approaches can contribute to evidence-based policy implementation in scholarly communication reform.
Accepted Paper
Short abstract
Long abstract
Policy makers increasingly mandate data sharing practices, yet we lack systematic evidence about the effectiveness of different implementation approaches. Using an agent-based model, we examine how funding schemes and incentive structures affect the uptake of data sharing practices among competing research teams.
Our simulations reveal a paradoxical relationship between competitive funding and data sharing: while highly competitive funding schemes with large grants can accelerate initial adoption, they lead to lower sharing rates in the long term. This occurs because the uncertainty associated with competitive funding negatively affects the cost-benefit ratio of data sharing for most teams. Conversely, more distributive funding schemes with smaller grants fail to provide teams with sufficient resources to absorb data sharing costs, also limiting uptake.
We find that without adequate support infrastructure to minimize costs, funding agencies alone are unlikely to drive sustainable adoption of data sharing practices.
The community structure of scientific fields further complicates this dynamic, with network effects generally dampening sharing rates compared to unconnected scenarios. Our findings suggest that attempts to reform reward systems toward open science principles must carefully consider the complex interplay between funding structures, incentives, and researchers' strategic adaptations.
In this talk, we examine in detail the critical roles of data sharing costs and cumulative advantage effects, with particular attention to how these factors can negatively impact sharing adoption. We conclude by critically examining how simulation approaches can contribute to evidence-based policy implementation in scholarly communication reform.
Money matters: funders & funding mechanisms
Session 1 Monday 30 June, 2025, -