Paper short abstract:

Can a local folk theory of race, which convincingly posits a non-essentialist view of race, predict results in an experimental task which asks ordinary people to decide whether race or other social categories are inferentially richer? This paper demonstrates how tools derived from cognitive psychology enrich the interpretation of ethnographic data.

Paper long abstract:

In Yapatera, Peru, a village descended from African slaves and indigenous labourers, I document a local folk theory of race, procreation and kinship which posits that personhood is physiologically and socially 'mixed'. The logical outcome is that no individual can be grouped unambiguously into any discrete racial category, thereby undermining the very existence of such racial groups and downplaying the importance of race as a meaningful social marker to favour class, locality and religion. Will the folk theory withstand experimental tasks where participants are forced to choose whether race or other social categories are inferentially richer? I introduce two tasks conducted at the end of 16 months of fieldwork, derived from cognitive psychology, but re-designed to answer questions which emerge from the local ethnographic context.

Evidence from evolutionary and cognitive psychology suggests that human adults and children think 'essentialistically' about race posing a challenge to a theory my informants hold on to dearly. My task results confirm how people respond to ideologies of mixing in their reasoning about race but also illuminate how they have at their disposal two alternate models of race through which to think. Holding on to one theory requires a concerted effort. This leads me to pay greater attention to inconsistencies of the local folk theory, to explore reactions to the task, and to reinterpret the way in which the category of 'race' matters. The combination of methods here can help explain how this specific group has adapted to their particular historical position.