Paper short abstract:

I will present the "Principle of the justification of moral responsibility" that allows us to establish to which different non-human beings we have moral responsibilities. It does not rely on any specific characteristic of the beings and allows for a shared moral attitude, for different reasons.

Paper long abstract:

Capability scholars have formulated various reasons for recognizing responsibilities to different beings. However, a criterion is needed to distinguish which of these responsibilities are moral (of higher stringency and for all human agents) and which are not. In this paper I will present a principle of practical reason, which will function as such a criterion, and which will allow us to navigate this diversity of reasons, establishing with which other-than-human beings we can recognize a moral responsibility.

In relation to other-than-human beings, certain human agents are able, for different reasons, to recognize the need to focus on what happens to these beings and to self-limit their actions on that basis. That is, they are capable of acting responsibly, assuming a commitment (Sen 1985, 2010). From this starting point, it is necessary to see whether this attitude can be extended to all human agents, becoming a moral responsibility.

For this purpose, I propose the Principle of the justification of moral responsibility: "Responsibilities of reason for all moral agents are those that cannot be rejected according to the criteria of generality, reasonable cost, reciprocity of reasons for a shareable attitude, feasibility, and reciprocity of burdens". Thus, the principle states that if we cannot find reasons to reasonably reject responsibility for a non-human being X (according to these components), then we say that all human agents have this responsibility and that it is therefore a moral responsibility.

This principle states that, unlike theoretical reason, practical reason does not seek agreement on reasons, but on actions to solve a problem or act in a certain way, not arbitrarily but responsibly. There may be different reasons, but what is essential is that they lead to the same need for a certain kind of action and attitude (which is the specificity of morality). This is a reformulation of Drydyk's (2011) proposal of the principle of responsible pluralism, which recognizes that there are different moral discourses that, while not necessarily in agreement, seek to support the same type of action (thus producing a pluralistic justification): In this case, taking moral responsibility. Therefore, what is sought here is to exclude reasons that do not support the same type of action or responsible attitude. This is also because the principle does not a priori, as do the other grounds proposed by capability scholars, presuppose a particular characteristic or relation as the basis for recognizing a moral duty.