Paper short abstract:

This paper offers an in-depth analysis of the role of the elites in the infrastructural reform measures of an internationally-driven police reform program in Dhaka City and its impact on the partyarchy public order of the transitional state-Bangladesh.

Paper long abstract:

This paper explores the role of the state elites, international actors (donors), and civil society organisations (CSOs) in the reform process of police in the capital city of Dhaka to understand the nature of obstruction, inertia and resistance for reform. The conceptual premise for this research is built upon how the power relations among the different state elite actors of a transitional state—that is historically evolved due to their involvements in nation-state formation processes and is inspired by the idea of Partyarchy (Coppedge, 1994)-led patronage network and neo-patrimonial elitism—have influenced the international donor-initiated Police Reform Programme (PRP) in Bangladesh. The empirical analysis of this paper concentrates on two major components of the PRP— (a) establishing model police stations in Dhaka City and (b) capacity development of Dhaka Met Police in surveillance and intelligence policing. In the analysis, the attempt is made to unpack the patterns of domestic elite convergences/divergences that have facilitated and obstructed the reform measures for Bangladesh Police through infrastructural developments in selective sectors. This analysis informs the security provisions in the existing partyarchy public order in Bangladesh. This chapter manifests a major argument that an externally assisted police reform does not autonomously contribute in the elite convergence process for a new public order. Instead, in a strong partyarchy state like Bangladesh, the patron-client relations between the elites shape the convergence to carry forward the reform in policing, hence, the reform process reproduces the order of the partyarchy state.