

Violence and Path Dependency: Pakistan and the Afghan Jihad

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Introduction

- Violence is not epiphenomenal in Pakistan
 - Since 2001 terrorism has resulted in 50,000 deaths (National Internal Security Policy nd)
 - Inflicted \$106.78 billion damage to the economy (Pakistan Economic Survey 2014-5)
- There are a number of contending explanations
 - consequence of joining the War of Terror
 - intervention by external agencies such as RAW and the CIA
 - or because the support such groups have Pakistani state agencies.
 - It's perceived to be a Pukthun problem
 - A rural problem
- I want to look at the social basis of this violence rather than simply looking for political explanations.
 - young men's attitude to violence: to understand the conveyor belt that leads young men into joining militant religious or ethnic organizations or criminal activity.

Critical junctures and Path Dependency

- Critical juncture: Dualism of short phase of fluidity alternating with longer phase of stability (Swidler 1986)
- Path dependency: 'once started down a certain track the cost of reversal are very high. The entrenchment of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice (Levi 1997)
- General Zia's Military Rule and critical juncture and path dependency
 - initiated processes that continue to impact
 - Military rule, Islamization and support for militancy

Critical junctures and Path Dependency

- Neither of these trends started with Zia
 - Authoritarianism goes back to Jinnah
 - Islamization: constitutional crisis of the 1950s and laws introduced by Zulfikhar Bhutto
 - Support for militants goes back to the tribal intervention in Kashmir in 1947
- What was new was how these dimension interlocked into Zia's strategy in propping up military rule.
 - Post-military rule the institutional strategy for supporting militants and Islamic groups continued showing path dependency
 - This relationship started a process that normalized violence

Critical junctures and Path Dependency

- Post-9/11 the strategy persisted despite problems
- Pakistan support for the Taliban brought tension with the USA
 - Wants influence in the Kabul government
 - US saw Pakistan more critically and deemed it a marginal satisfier
 - Also increased risk of conflict with India; Mumbai attack
- This policy also created problems internally
 - Swat Operations
 - Peshawar school attack resulting in Operation Zarb-e-Azab

Critical junctures and Path Dependency

- National Action Plan: extended to include FATA, Balochistan and Karachi
 - Some fall in violence:
 - | 2009 | 2015 | 2016 |
|-------|------|------------|
| 11704 | 3682 | 831 (1334) |
 - Total deaths
- This is only a partial shift and the strategy still holds
- Discursive analysis claiming violence has become embedded which critics can argue:
 - Doesn't demonstrate high levels of attitude to violence
 - Or casual link between different forms of violence

Violence

- Definition of violence:
 - Gurr (1974) narrow definition limited to violence in the political domain.
 - Krug (2000) broader definition includes power and links interpersonal violence thought to collective violence
- Context:
 - Informal economy predicated on violence or threat of
 - Sustained violence in a society thought conflict or war leads to hyper-masculinity
 - Where violent behavior becomes normalized (Pankhurst)
 - This concept explains how violence in the public sphere penetrates the private sphere e.g. Honor Killings etc.

Data Collection


- Pilot Study
- Mixed methods
 - Questionnaire N 200
 - Elite interviews N 15
 - Focus Groups N 4
- Site:
 - Saddar Rawalpindi
 - Hazro Tehsil

Sample Profile

	Age Profile		Mother Tongue		Education		Income in Rupees		Marital Status
18+	70	Punjabi	75	No Education	10	Below Rs 10,000	36	Married	37
20+	34	Pukhto	35	Primary	24	10,000-15000	63	Un-Married	139
22+	20	Hindko	36	Secondary	15	15000-30000	16		
24+	14	Urdu	28	Metric	38	30000-65000	42		
26+	7	Seraki	3	Intermediate	54	65000-100000	9		
28+	11	Sindhi	1	Bachelors	29	100000-250000	3		
30+	12	Other Specify	1	Masters	9	250000+	5		
Other Specify	11			M.Phil/PhD	2				
Total	179			Total	181	Total	174	Total	176
Missing	4			Missing	2	Missing	9	Missing	7
Total	183			Total	183	Total	183	Total	183

Attitudes to Violence


Attitudes to Force and Firearms



- Nearly 48% strongly agreed or slightly agreed with the question (Q20) that 'Everyone needs to be ready to use force to assert their rights, as no-one else will do it for us'
 - 59% in the urban areas while only 37% in rural areas were in agreement.
 - Punjabi speaking respondents had 45% strongly agreeing

Attitudes to Violence

Attitudes to Force and Firearms




Attitudes to Violence

- Forty-three per cent of respondents strongly agreed or slightly agreed with the question (Q21) that 'Killing someone in revenge is an acceptable thing to do'.
 - 47% in the urban areas and 40% in the rural areas were in agreement
 - There is a significant effect of 'income' among respondents earning under Rs 10,000 per month.

Attitudes to Violence

Attitudes to Terrorism




■ Strongly agree & slightly agree in % ■ Neither agree nor disagree in % ■ Strongly disagree & slightly disagree in %

Attitudes to Violence

- 70% agreed that hate speech should be banned.
 - greater support in rural areas with 82% agreement while in urban areas there was only 66% agreement.
- Only 20% agreed that fatwas should be legally regulated
- 65% rejected that Pakistan needed a violent revolution
 - 18% of respondents were in agreement
- Over 70% did not accept suicide attacks on non-believers was religiously acceptable.
 - 15% were in agreement

Attitudes to Violence

Gender Equality, Empowerment and Violence against Women



■ Strongly agree and Slightly agree in % ■ Neither agree nor disagree in % ■ Slightly disagree and Strongly disagree in %

Attitudes to Violence

- Over 56% of respondents believed that women activity should be restricted to the domestic sphere
- Forty-seven per cent of respondents believed that Islam did allow women participation in the public sphere
- 50% of respondents felt that it was women's fault if she got raped
- **Use of force (both questions) and Violence against women (4 questions)** – significant (.023) positive relationship between responses to these questions, so this suggests that those with attitudes that show support for violence against women also have low adherence to the state monopoly on the use of force and vice versa.

Conclusion

- Preliminary result show:
 - Normalization of attitudes to violence
 - More of urban than rural problem
 - More significant among Punjabi speakers
 - Link between attitudes to violence and violence against women
- Path dependence
 - This a consequence of the turn in the 1980s to support the Afghan intervention
 - NAP is a tactic to calm the situation in the cities
 - The army resists change in strategy