Paper short abstract:

This paper studies contradictory and changeable British famine policy in India in 1860-70s and the role of the parliamentary business lobby in the process of its elaboration and implementation.

Paper long abstract:

In 1860-70s the British authorities tested various theoretical ideas and practical methods to prevent famines or minimize level of starvation and mortality in India: from total inaction in accordance with free-trade doctrine during Orissa famine (1866) and tough state regulation by means of organization of public works, large-scaled food procurement, market prices' restrain during Bihar-Bengal famine (1873-1874) to a limited interference in the situation during Madras famine (1877). Disastrous effects of Orissa famine entailed strong criticism in the British parliament. Overwhelming majority of its members were the representatives of commercial and industrial circles who used Orissa famine as an instrument to strengthen pressure and influence on Indian authorities. Accusing officials of inaction and irresponsibility they insisted on the intensification of public works' projects and active state participation in their implementation. Although free-trade staunch adherents at home, in the colony they were interested in strong state support and guarantees of their profits, well-developed infrastructure and wide range of investment projects. While the authorities went from one extreme to another in the attempt to overcome famines, the British businessmen used recurrent starvations in India to lobby for their own business interests, for example to promote highly remunerative railroad building rather than law-profit irrigation construction. Experience of these decades led to a formulation by the very beginning of 1880-s of more or less balanced famine policy that combined a range of indirect protective/preventive measures and a very restrained intrusion into market mechanisms.