Paper short abstract:

The paper analyzes the decision-making calculus of African nondemocratic regimes in establishing regional organizations and formal regional mechanisms to foster constitutional governance, thereby accepting to cede sovereignty.

Paper long abstract:

In assessing the specific nature of nondemocratic forms of cooperation, scholars recurrently hypothesize that authoritarian regimes shy away from entering into legal frameworks that limit their sovereignty (e.g. Erdmann et al. 2013). However, sub-Saharan Africa, where only 9 out of 49 countries are rated "free" by Freedom House, features one of the strongest regional integration projects worldwide. Particularly noteworthy are the African Union and sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS and SADC's substantial provisions towards good governance, against unconstitutional changes of government, and the regular use of regional sanctions in the context of regional organizations to enforce these rules. To a significant extent, authoritarian regimes have bound themselves, at least as the transfer of power is concerned. Do these provisions only serve authoritarian governments' own interests to stay in power? An analysis of regional organizations and the specific frameworks on good governance in sub-Saharan Africa goes a long way in providing new insights into the nature of - legally binding - authoritarian cooperation and its interrelationship with questions of internally and externally conferred government legitimacy. Based on existing literature (Bellamy and Williams 2011; Witt 2012; Hellquist 2014; Börzel and Hüllen 2015), statistical analysis and original field research, the paper analyzes the decision-making calculus of African nondemocratic regimes in establishing formal regional mechanisms to foster constitutional governance, thereby accepting to cede sovereignty.