Paper short abstract:

Contrary to popular notions that there is often a cordial relationship between political elites and militias associated with electoral manipulations, this article posits that the lack of trust between these two groups often lead to the formation of new militias during each electoral cycle.

Paper long abstract:

Elections in Nigeria, particularly the oil rich Niger Delta, are often fraught with irregularities and pockets of violence. The resource allocation formula used by the federal government to offset the impact of oil exploration activities in the region boosts the income of the Niger Delta states in relation to other non- oil producing states in Nigeria. The relative 'richness' of the Niger Delta states increases the stakes for electoral representation but in a predatory manner. Electoral positions are seen as avenues to enrich the elite and their cronies at the expense of the state and this results in electoral malpractices and the use of violence.

Since the return of Nigeria to democratic government in 1999, there has been an increase in the use of militias to seize or maintain control of political institutions in most of the Niger Delta states. This paper explores the roles played by militia groups before, during and after elections and the relationship between the groups and their patrons. Contrary to the notion that more established militias can effectively serve the interest of their patrons, the paper argues that the lack of trust between politicians and militias result in politicians employing the services of different groups for future elections and this development leads to the formation of new groups during each electoral cycle. This analysis is based on an empirical research carried out in the three states in the Niger Delta between 2013-2016.