Paper short abstract:

Can legislatures in electoral autocracies contribute to more democracy in the long run? To answer this question, the paper uses Social Network Analysis to analyse government-opposition interaction in Togo.

Paper long abstract:

Research on electoral authoritarianism is arguing that institutions like legislatures and parties play an important role for regime survival. While several studies have found that autocracies which hold elections are more stable than those who do not, other authors claim that the more successive elections take place, the more democratic a regime becomes. The relationship between actors and institutions is, however, always two-sided: while institutions place constraints on actors, they are at the same time shaped by actors' behavior and decision-making. It is therefore necessary to look more closely at the underlying micro-logic of institutions in electoral autocracies.

The paper which is proposed here seeks to make a contribution in this area. On the basis of newly collected survey data from the National Assembly of Togo (response rate 79%), it sheds light on political discussion networks between government and opposition. One major question will be answered: Is the legislature an arena that helps to bridge the antagonism between government and opposition and thereby contribute to more democracy in the long run? Using Social Network Analysis, especially Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGMs), the paper shows three things: firstly, although MPs seek political discussion partners often within their own political party, there is also a considerable number of communication links that cut across the rival camps. Secondly, a longer tenure in the parliament increases the likelihood of ties to deputies from the other political camp. Thirdly, certain actors - especially politicians from co-opted parties - may play an important role in brokering links between government and opposition.