Paper short abstract:

This article examines the overlooked facet of the motives for development cooperation between emerging donors in Asia and partners in Africa: the self-enriching motives by a few at the top enabled by corruption and crony relationships within emerging donors.

Paper long abstract:

So-called emerging donors from the East have refreshed debates on the motives for giving aid. Classic perspectives in International Relations find political or commercial motives, and some suggest a humanitarian cause, while others attribute such giving to a hybridity model. On the other hand, middle power discourse focuses on social identification in international society. One less-discussed facet is domestic corruption and crony relationships within emerging donors. Korea offers a case in point as to the lack of institutional transparency which undermines efficacy and trust in the aid industry of the nation. It has little or no history of transparent governance and a shorter history as a donor. Amid the sense of growing competition in Asia over Africa and self-identification as middle power country with an experience of fast economic growth, the Korean government increased the level of development cooperation with Africa, backed by supportive national sentiment since the 1990s. The lack of experience as a donor and the self-enriching motives by the president's inner circles, however, limit Korea's long-term development cooperation with Africa. This paper examines the 'Korea Aid' project taking place in three African countries in 2016, and argues that the development project driven by the self-enriching motive resulted in groundless development projects with no consideration of local circumstances in Africa and turned taxpayers in Korea sceptical to international development cooperation. In the process, Africa becomes a landfill to dump ill-designed development projects the real benefit of which was drained by the inner circles of the emerging donor.