Paper short abstract:

The paper analyses the conditions under which ‘indirect rule’ type governance arrangements emerge in contexts of armed conflict and the consequences these have, based on fieldwork and data collected in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

Paper long abstract:

Recent literature has shown that the study of armed conflict can be highly informative to understand processes of state building. One of the fundamental choices that states or other military actors face when occupying new territories and populations is whether to administer them by developing novel administrations (direct rule), or by devolving rule to pre-existing local authorities (indirect Rule). The literature on the political and economic legacies of colonial rule has shown that this choice can have far reaching consequences in terms of state capacity and legitimacy, affecting long term development trajectories. Yet the conditions under which indirect rule emerged in the colonial period are very difficult to observe and analyse. Building on the analogy between armed factions in contemporary conflict settings and states in the making, this paper explores the conditions under which indirect rule emerges in contexts of armed conflict, and the consequences that this governance arrangement has on local governance institutions, their capacity and their legitimacy. The paper adopts a historical and qualitative perspective, building on fieldwork and interviews carried out in eastern DRC. It provides a heuristic and theoretical discussion of the strengths and limitations of the comparison between armed factions and proto-states, and develops novel analytical tools to understand 'indirect rule' governance arrangements by armed factions.