Click the star to add/remove an item to/from your individual schedule.
You need to be logged in to avail of this functionality.
Log in
Accepted Paper:
Paper short abstract:
Why is it challenging for informal workers to defend their rights and interests in urban Ghana? We examine this question by scrutinizing the socioeconomic and political dynamics that shape and are shaped by informal workers’ engagements with each other, local government and external partners.
Paper long abstract:
It is estimated that around 90% of Ghana's workforce is active in the informal economy. The immense diversity among people and activities constituting the informal sector makes coming to collective action difficult: diverse socio-economic positions equal diverging (and often conflicting) interests. How do informal workers then defend their rights and interests in challenging urban and economic spaces?
In this paper we explore this question by analysing two case studies which concern planned relocations of large groups of informal workers in two of Ghana's biggest cities. The first case is that of Makola's 31st December market, one of Accra's oldest markets. The second case pertains to an informal industrial cluster focusing on vehicle repair, better known as Suame Magazine in Kumasi. In both cases a number of external partners, ranging from trade unions to international donor agencies, have become (in)directly involved with informal workers' organizations in an attempt to increase their political leverage and assist them in defending their rights and interests.
We draw on qualitative data gathered during two months of ethnographic fieldwork among informal workers and (their) organizations in each location to show how and why this external involvement often does not accomplish what it intended to do. More specifically, we scrutinize the socioeconomic and political dynamics that shape and are shaped by informal workers' engagements with each other, local government and external partners and argue that these relationships are fraught with friction (Tsing 2005, 2015). While friction often causes initiatives to implode, it is also potentially productive.
Who Owns the City? Political Leverage for Informal Workers in Urban Africa
Session 1