Paper short abstract:

The paper links Niger and Tunisia's bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU to the ability of their political elites to achieve internal consensus on foreign policy choices. The hypothesis is that the more stable government in Niamey has benefited more than Tunis from the relationship with the EU.

Paper long abstract:

The paper investigates patterns of elite formation, resistance and disruption in Tunisia and Niger, and analyses their impact on the foreign policy choices adopted vis-à-vis the EU. Since 2011 Niger and Tunisia have been faced with persisting crises linked to security, governance, and migration. This “geopolitical" condition made both countries absolutely crucial to the new EU foreign policy strategy. The latter is indeed based on bargaining material and immaterial benefits with neighbouring countries in exchange for the adoption of more restrictive security and mobility policies on their part.

While most studies in the field of EU-Africa relations have focused on EU externalisation policies, on the one hand, or the extraversion and the cooptation of African elites, on the other, I offer a more dynamic and relational bargaining perspective which pays attention both to the internal and the external implications of foreign policy conduct. The hypothesis that will be explored is that Niger, as opposed to Tunisia, has managed to improve its position vis-à-vis the EU due to its more stable political situation. In Niger the solid PNDS-Tarayya party firmly controls most branches of power and hence the elites have been very able to reach wide internal consensus over policy choices. Conversely in Tunisia, after the radical changements following the revolution, the persisting fragmentation of the political landscape allowed the EU to interfere more heavily with Tunis’ political priorities and agenda.

The qualitative data analysis is based on elite interviews, as well as archival resources, examined through process tracing methods.