Paper short abstract:

We examine elected officials’ strategies for human security outcomes through the prism of the ongoing decentralization programmes in Rwanda and Ghana. We show that despite their official limitations, elected councillors use outside channels as the room to maneuver in realizing human security goals.

Paper long abstract:

In developing countries, the fundamental promise of human security is the improvement in living conditions. At the local level decentralization is considered the silver bullet for implementation. Elected local officials should represent local needs and decide on priorities. How does this work? We compare the cases of two success stories of decentralization in Africa: Ghana and Rwanda despite their different political systems, i.e., a liberal democracy with a vocal civil society (Ghana) and an authoritarian system with a democratic façade (Rwanda). In both countries, the central government interferes, at least implicitly, by setting the policy and financial frameworks for human security programmes. We ask firstly, who sets priorities for implementing projects at the local level? Secondly, to what extent do local institutional arrangements influence autonomous decision-making?

In both countries, local councillors use their limited formal influence to advance local interests. They use local performance contracts (Imihigo) originally designed as an instrument of control by the central government to pressure elected mayors and the local administration (Rwanda). Additionally, they attempt to overcome central government influence by engaging in local development brokerage involving NGOs or international development organizations (Ghana). This shows that the question of human security plays a role in local politics. In both cases the formal structures of decentralization set limits for participation. At the same time, local councillors seek ways to widen their room to maneuver.