Paper short abstract:

What drives legislators’ constituency focus under closed list proportional representation (CLPR) systems? Using an original dataset of over 20,000 questions between 2006 and 2022, we test three hypotheses concerning electoral vulnerability, seniority legislators, and localness.

Paper long abstract:

What drives legislators’ constituency focus under closed list proportional representation (CLPR) systems?

CLPR systems are said to offer fewer incentives for legislators to cultivate the personal vote and cater to

district interests. We argue that legislators will have electoral and career-shaped predispositions to perform

constituency-focused activities, as they seek to pursue their goals and satisfy their principals. Drawing on an

original dataset of 20,293 questions submitted to the Parliament of South Africa between 2006 and 2022 and

on legislators’ biographic data, we test three hypotheses, namely that more electorally vulnerable legislators,

junior legislators, and those with prior political experience in the district will have more incentives to perform

constituency based activities. Our results lend support to the hypotheses on electoral vulnerability and

localness but run counter to most studies as we show that seniority fosters rather than diminishes

constituency focus. These findings clarify the importance of individual level factors beyond institutional

constraints. They also nuance existing studies that downplay the role of constituency service in

party-controlled assemblies in Africa.