Paper short abstract:

Extraversion keeps regimes in power through commercial alliances with external actors, even when unpopular or illegitimate at home. Through case studies from Sierra Leone and Liberia, this paper will examine the compatibility of the concept with regimes transformed by neoliberal reforms.

Paper long abstract:

Bayart defined extraversion as the practice by ruling African regimes of managing the "unequal relationship with the international economic system . . . to derive from it the resources necessary for their domestic overlordship" (2000: 231). Extraversion enables ruling regimes to stay in power through commercial alliances with external actors, even when domestically unpopular or illegitimate. During their recent history, Sierra Leone and Liberia presented classic examples of extraversion, with successive régimes holding power through commercial alliances with multinational corporations invested in extractive mineral industries and agribusiness. At various times in recent history, these companies went beyond supporting ruling regimes: they became their proxies by taking over state functions in the enclaves they controlled, including the provision of security and of a range of social services. In the aftermath of neoliberal land reform legislation passed in recent years, however, these commercial alliances are formed with an expanding range of political actors and institutions, well beyond central government--all of whom hold oversight and stand to benefit from them. Based on research in these two countries, this paper examines some of the ways in which politics of extraversion articulate with neoliberal policies.