Paper short abstract:

Why do we see local dispute processes in cities such as Freetown, where we might expect that ties to traditional authorities are weaker? As the demography of African cities such as Freetown continues to change, it compels a new understanding of law and the role of the state.

Paper long abstract:

The notion that a statutorily prohibited dispute resolution mechanism can exist in parallel with the formal legal structure raises questions about the particularities of the state, such as the perceptions and performances of its institutions, including its primacy to make laws. Following the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone, in which the maladministration of justice was cited among its root causes, its capital, Freetown, witnessed a three-fold increase in population, placing pressure on the state in the delivery of services like security and justice. This paper will examine the (re)emergence of chiefs and their barrays - local dispute-management forums - in Freetown, where such courts are legally prohibited. It will explore the social, economic and political networks that support them, and why or in the different ways Freetown's urban population is motivated to engage chiefs and their barrays with, or instead of, the official legal architecture. In particular, it will examine the types of cases brought before the barrays, assessing their malleability and scope, and also providing a lens through which to analyse socio-economic and legal relations with, and beyond the state. Through adjudication of cases, this paper will shed light on how Freetown's residents constantly navigate between the (absence of de facto) state functionaries and the (outlawed) barrays. In so doing, this paper will contribute to broadening conventional understandings of law, including the practice of 'improvising law', informed by not only customary and formal traditions, but also responsive to local and evolving practices, norms and needs.