Paper short abstract:

Based on fieldwork in provinces of former Katanga, this paper provides empirical evidence of the networks of patronage that connect provincial elites with central government elites and assesses their impact on decentralization policies.

Paper long abstract:

Expectations that Congolese decentralisation would result in improved provincial governance were predicated upon an understanding of provincial elites as autonomous from Kinshasa. In reality, they are deeply

embedded in informal patronage networks that reach out across the country, emanating from the presidency

outwards. These networks are highly centralised, weaving a web that largely neutralises the political, financial and administrative autonomy of provinces.

We show that features of this web include: the informal control of political and administrative appointments, that should be provincially allocated, by elites in and around the presidency; financial poaching of provincial actors; predatory extractive pressures by central elites; the use of political 'godfathers' to maintain indirect oversight of provincial elites; the use of provincial legislative authorities as tools

for sanctioning unreliable governors.

Under these conditions, effective decentralisation remains elusive.