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## **Relations between NGOs and MMD governments in Zambia.**

DRAFT VERSION

The principal aim of this paper is to critically examine the involvement of local non-governmental organizations in the governance process in Zambia under the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) rule.

This paper is based primarily on field studies conducted in Zambia in 2010 and 2011, during which over 20 in-depth interviews were conducted with politicians, representatives of civil society, university workers and representatives of the mining industry. The research process was guided by social constructivist epistemology, and the major finding is that relations between MMD government and advocacy NGOs were characterized by mutual distrust, and mutual accusation of a lack of transparency and legitimacy. The NGOs were mainly employing a “name and shame” strategy while engaging the government, what together with MMD suspicious attitude towards NGOs created a specific ideational structure of mistrust and mutual suspicion. This dynamic is extremely difficult to break, and is the dominant influence on government – NGOs relations.

### **Introduction**

Zambia in the mid 1990s was presented as a “rent seeking state with strong civil society”<sup>1</sup> – the first Anglophone state in Sub-Saharan Africa which experienced peaceful political transition - a country where the political party originated in the civil society movement removed Kenneth Kaunda from power. The principal aim of this paper is to examine the involvement of the local non-governmental organizations in the governance process in Zambia under the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) rule. The research process was guided by social constructivist epistemology. The author sought to understand both the motivations for actions and the very perception of the Zambian political process held by the representatives of advocacy NGOs in Zambia.

This paper is based primarily on field studies conducted in Zambia in September and October 2010 and during the election process in September 2011, and is supported by extensive desk research and a survey of the literature. The narrative is chronological, and it focuses on the key developments in relations between the MMD administration and NGOs. The study was also supported by a public opinion survey, conducted in Lusaka, Livingston, Mazabuka and Kitwe among 164 Zambians<sup>2</sup>. The public opinion survey does not have the character of rigorous sociological research, as the sample does not reflect Zambian society, however the results were interpreted as symptomatic of Zambian society’s perception of non-governmental activity. Additionally, direct interactions with Zambians gave author the possibility of a deeper understanding of socio-political processes in this country.

The first section briefly presents political developments in Zambia and the role of non-governmental actors (with a special emphasis on trade unions) during the process of Kenneth Kaunda’s removal from power. In the second section various dimensions of NGOs – government relations under Friderik Chiluba were taken into consideration, and most

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<sup>1</sup> B. Waldenhof, *The Participation of Civil Society – Potential for fighting Poverty and Challenging Neopatrimonial Practices*, in: “Poverty Reduction in a Political Trap? The PRS Process and Neopatrimonialism in Zambia”, ed. W. Eberlei, P. Meyns, F. Mutesa, UNZA Press, Lusaka 2005, pp. 143

<sup>2</sup> Author wants to express his gratitude to dr. Konrad Czernichowski who developed the survey’s results.

important of these was the establishment of the ideational structure of mutual suspicion and distrust, which was to determine the relations between the MMD administration and advocacy NGOs. The third section focuses on the issue of copper revenues governance and transparency as well as on the processes of strengthening the structure of mutual suspicion and distrust. The last section concludes.

## 1. Political developments of Zambia

It might be said, that Zambia's post-independence history was "typical" for the majority of Sub-Saharan states. Zambia experienced respectively: transformation into a one-party state, nationalization of its mining industry, a deep economic downturn, the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs and difficult relations with international financial institutions, restoration of a multiparty political system and the privatization of copper mines<sup>3</sup>. However, despite ethnic heterogeneity, Zambia did not experience civil wars or successful military coups.

Throughout the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s, Zambia was considered a middle-income country with ample opportunity to match European states in terms of development. The belief that Zambia might catch up with European states was based on a relatively well developed industrial base, a high urbanization rate and rich copper deposits<sup>4</sup>.

Kenneth Kaunda coined the idea of "African Humanism" which became official state doctrine<sup>5</sup>. In the 1970s, the narrative of the struggle for independence and a "full humanity" (bemba: *ubuntungwa*) was replaced by the rhetoric of modernization and independence from a direct structure of ownership of the mining industry and indirect influences of developed states (the lack of skills and know-how). In 1972 Zambia was declared a one-party state, the copper mines were nationalized and multiple parastatal organisations were created<sup>6</sup>. These processes can be correlated with the ideology of Humanism and Kenneth Kaunda's desire to build a welfare state<sup>7</sup>, however the control over the mining industry opened the possibility of filling new positions in the mining sector with people loyal to Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP). What is equally important as the careful allocation of positions was one of the policies aimed at mitigating the possible conflicts between various ethnic groups in Zambia<sup>8</sup>. The release of tensions between ethnic groups by certain provisions of positions in both state administration and parastatal organizations is often overlooked in the discourse<sup>9</sup> and it can be seen as a partial explanation for the non-occurrence of civil wars and military coups in Zambia. On the other hand, the patronage policy (Zambia under Kaunda is sometimes presented as a prime example of an African neo-patrimonial state) led to frequent changes in important positions and consequently created a lack of continuity regarding certain policies, as the major criterion for the appointment was loyalty to the supervisor<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> G. Erdman, N. Simutanyi, *Transition in Zambia: The Hybridisation of the Third Republic*, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Lilongwe 2003; W.D. Grant, *Zambia, Then and Now. Colonial Rulers and their African Successors*, Routledge, London and New York 2009, pp. 155-171.

<sup>4</sup> In the 1960s and 70s copper prices were correlated with the occurrence of armed conflict, as copper has been widely used in the arms industry.

<sup>5</sup> D.M. Mulenga, *The Political Theology of Dr. Kenneth David Kaunda: An Analysis of Zambian Humanism from 1964 to 1991*, LAP Lambert Academic Publishing 2011.

<sup>6</sup> J.H. Chileshe, *Third World Countries and Development Options: Zambia*, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi 1986, pp.100-144.

<sup>7</sup> S. Brooker, W. Hoppers, *The Zambian Community and its Economy*, Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, Lusaka 1986, pp. 190-195.

<sup>8</sup> Interview with dr. M.C. Musambachime, UNZA, Lusaka, 6.09.2010.

<sup>9</sup> Interview with dr. Ch. Ng'andwe, UNZA, Lusaka, 07.09.2010.

<sup>10</sup> Martin Meredith estimated that Kenneth Kaunda had in Lusaka alone, 40 000 of his clients. M. Meredith, *The State of Africa. A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, Free Press, Sydney 2006, p. 380. According to

Inefficiency in both copper mines and copper revenues management and the consequences of the 1970s oil shocks, together with the collapse of the world copper market and the costly involvement in the struggle against apartheid regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia led to Zambia's economic downturn. The situation was worsened by the droughts. From mid 1980s, the country has been ranked among the world's poorest nations and Kaunda's government started harsh relations with International Financial Institutions.

Simultaneously, Zambia is often presented as a very example of the third wave of democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa as Kenneth Kaunda was removed from power peacefully in 1991. NGOs, intellectuals, academics, representatives of churches and most importantly trade unions were of key importance in the process of Kenneth Kaunda's removal from power<sup>11</sup>.

Church leaders officially did not support MMD during the political transformation, but they widely criticized the legitimacy of UNIP in staying in power and called for the restoration of political pluralism<sup>12</sup>. Church leaders were also vocal critics of the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs in Zambia. The Christian Council of Zambia, the Zambia Episcopal Conference and Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia facilitated interparty negotiations between the UNIP and MMD in 1990 in the Cathedral of the Holy Cross<sup>13</sup>, which was an important communication channel in the process of constitutional reform.

From the 1970s the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) acted as the *de facto* opposition to UNIP<sup>14</sup> (political activists outside of the UNIP were illegal from 1972 onwards). During the political transition ZCTU formed the infrastructural base for the National Interim Committee for Multi-Party Democracy which later was transformed into the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), and ZCTU president Friderik Chiluba became the successor of Kenneth Kaunda<sup>15</sup>. MMD might be perceived as a civil society movement that transformed itself into a political party and took power in Zambia because of its ability to mobilize society and to put pressure on UNIP to change the constitution. The broad coalition of non-governmental actors<sup>16</sup> who created the MMD gave hope that the new government would be

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Scudder, Kaunda has had to constantly increase the resources available to the government in order to keep the political system in balance, which was a rationalization for the nationalization of the copper industry, T. Scudder, *Global Threats, Global Futures. Living with Declining Living Standards*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton 2010, pp. 189–190.

<sup>11</sup> D.M.C. Bartlett, *Civil Society and Democracy: a Zambian Case Study*, "Journal of Southern African Studies", Vol. 26, No. 3, September 2000, pp. 431–436.

<sup>12</sup> J.C. Momba, *Democratic Transition and the Crises of an African Nationalist Party: UNIP, Zambia*, w: *African Political Parties. Evolution, Institutionalisation and Governance*, ed. M.A.M. Salih, Pluto Press, London 2003, p. 46; M. Hinfelaar, *Legitimizing powers: The political role of Roman Catholic Church, 1972–1991*, w: *One Zambia Many Histories. Towards a History of Post-colonial Zambia*, ed. J-B. Gewald, M. Hinfelaar, G. Macola, Brill, Lusaka 2009, pp. 141–142.

<sup>13</sup> R.L. Sakala, *Zambia Entering the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Zambia Printing Company, Lusaka 2001, pp. 22–23.

<sup>14</sup> M. Larmer, *'The Hour Has Come at the Pit': The Mineworkers' Union of Zambia and the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, 1982–1991*, "Journal of Southern African Studies", Vol. 32, No. 2, June 2006, pp. 293–312; J.K. van Donge, *Zambia: Kaunda and Chiluba. Enduring patterns of political culture*, in: "Democracy and Political change in Sub-Saharan Africa", ed. J.A. Wiseman, Routledge, London 1995, p. 197.

<sup>15</sup> S.W. Nasong'o, *Contending Political Paradigms in Africa. Rationality and the Politics of Democratization in Kenya and Zambia*, Routledge, New York–London 2005, pp. 75–76; A. Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics*, Routledge, London–New York 2006, p. 235. The peaceful transformation of the political system of Zambia in 1991 was the result of intraparty opposition to Kaunda, a disastrous economic situation, massive public protests in Copperbelt and Lusaka (so-called *food riots*), and the emergence of a viable alternative to UNIP in the form of MMD.

<sup>16</sup> Besides ZCTU, Movement for Multiparty Democracy was created by the associations of professionals and Zambian businessman.

more sensitive to the voice of CSOs and that the role of non-governmental actors would increase.

Usually, the legislature is a natural target of various advocacy lobbying groups. The new Constitution introduced political pluralism, but it remained an extremely weak Parliament, as neither the UNIP nor MMD wanted a strong legislature<sup>17</sup>. This feature of the political system might be perceived as one of the reasons why communication between governments and non-governmental organizations is so strained in Zambia.

## **2. MMD relations with NGOs under Friderik Chiluba**

In the 1990s, 36 new political parties and over 4.000 new NGOs were registered in Zambia<sup>18</sup> what might be perceived as a symptom of the vitality of Zambian civil society. At the same time in the early stages of MMD rule, Zambian civil society movements did not see the need to build counterbalances to the government since it was expected that the new political elite, which positioned itself as originating from civil society movements, would launch a fruitful dialogue with advocacy NGOs and remove pathologies from Zambian politics. Disappointingly, Chiluba did not remove the worst habits of the previous administration from the political life; in fact, one can even argue that clientelism, corruption and nepotism deepened under Chiluba<sup>19</sup>.

Relations between NGOs and the MMD administration in the last decade of the 20th century can be characterized by four interrelated processes: divisions within the trade union movement, deteriorating relations between the government and the faith based NGOs, civil society protests against constitutional reforms aimed at ensuring Chiluba's hold on power, and the creation of the ideational structure of mutual suspicion and distrust in government relations with NGOs.

### **• Division within the trade union movement**

As previously mentioned, strong trade unions were the major non-governmental political force in Zambia in the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, Chiluba, as a former ZCTU president, was fully aware that under his presidency trade union movement was the best-organized, quasi-political force in the country<sup>20</sup>. Chiluba's political masterpiece was the removal of the UNIP's regulation - "one industry one trade union"<sup>21</sup>, which together with the privatization of copper mines, constantly decreasing numbers of people working in the mines and personal conflicts within ZCTU led to divisions within the Zambian trade union movement. In the mid 1990s the trade union movement in Zambia has been permanently divided, and was unable to play any significant role in Zambian politics.

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<sup>17</sup> A. Sardanis, *Africa: Another Side of the Coin. Northern Rhodesia's Final Years and Zambia's Nationhood*, I.B. Tauris, London-New York 2003, pp. 306-307.

<sup>18</sup> L. Rakner, *Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991–2001*, The Nordic Africa Institute, Stockholm 2003, p. 16; Peter Burnell estimated total number of NGOs active in Zambia in the late 90s at 9.000, P. Burnell, *Taking stock of democracy in Zambia*, „Democracy and Political Change in the 'Third World'”, ed. J. Haynes, Routledge, London, New York 2001, p. 139.

<sup>19</sup> Paradoxically, after the implementation of the guidelines of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the area of privatization and market opening to foreign investment, Zambia was referred to as a "model transition state", however the access to international funds, together with the money from the privatization of mines gave Chiluba's administration the ability to reinforce clientelist and neo-patrimonial networks.

<sup>20</sup> Interview with V. Lengwe, Mine Workers Union of Zambia, Kitwe, 21.09.2010; Interview with B. Chibalem, National Union of Miners and Allied Workers, Kitwe, 20.09.2010.

<sup>21</sup> Chiluba was fully aware of internal divisions and personal conflicts in the trade union movement.

Theoretically the most effective pressure on the government could have been exerted by unions operating in the mining industry since copper assured 90% of Zambia's foreign revenues. Spokesmen of the National Union of Miners and Allied Workers and spokesmen of the Mine Workers Union of Zambia both confirmed the need of co-operation among their unions, but they rejected the scenario according to which trade unions could unite and play a similar role in Zambian politics as it was the case in the 1980s<sup>22</sup>.

The results of surveys conducted among Zambians showed that 78 out of 164 interviewed Zambians felt that trade unions have an impact on the political situation of Zambia, and 70 people were of the opposite opinion.

### ● Relations with faith based NGOs

At the very beginning of his presidency, Chiluba, influenced by a charismatic church, declared Zambia a "Christian nation". This action was criticized by the Christian Council of Zambia and the Roman Catholic Church; on the other hand full support for the "declaration" was expressed by various Pentecostal Churches<sup>23</sup>. The Roman Catholic Church and the Christian Council of Zambia argued that such a decision should have been made in consultation with faith groups and Zambian society. In the 1990s there was a significant increase in the number of registered religious groups in Zambia. Peter Burnell estimated that at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century 9,000 different kinds of churches and over 13,000 religious organizations were active in the country<sup>24</sup>. The Catholic Secretariat and Council of Churches in Zambia are among the most vocal Zambian NGOs. Open conflict between the Catholic Church and the MMD administration erupted in 1993, when the government withdrew food subsidies. In the pastoral letter printed in the Zambian press, MMD policy has been called "economic apartheid"<sup>25</sup>.

### ● Constitutional reforms and anti-third term campaign

In the mid 1990s NGO representatives openly started to criticize the MMD administration. The event, which mostly contributed to the deterioration of the President's image were changes made to the constitution in 1996, when an amendment was passed according to which both parents of a presidential candidate had to be born in Zambia, which was a direct attempt to ban Kenneth Kaunda from running as a presidential candidate<sup>26</sup>. Many national and international NGOs refused to monitor the election process; however there was no coordination center of non-governmental organizations and with a divided opposition, Chiluba secured another term in office.

Probably the most successful action of Zambian advocacy NGOs was the prevention of the constitutional amendments in 2000 aimed at securing a third term in office for Frideric Chiluba. The real threat of instrumental usage of the constitution was a direct cause of the

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<sup>22</sup> Interview with V.Lengwe, Mine Workers Union of Zambia, Kitwe, 21.09.2010; Interview with B. Chibale, National Union of Miners and Allied Workers, Kitwe, 20.09.2010.

<sup>23</sup> I.A. Phiri, *President Frederick Chiluba and Zambia: Evangelicals and Democracy in a „Christian Nation”*, in: *Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Africa*, ed. T.O. Ranger, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008, pp. 103–104.

<sup>24</sup> P. Burnell, *Taking ...*, op.cit., s. 140.

<sup>25</sup> P. Burnell, *The Politics of Poverty and the Poverty of Politics in Zambia's Third Republic*, „Third World Quarterly” 1995, Vol. 16, No. 4, s. 685.

<sup>26</sup> J. Hartchard, M. Ndulo, P. Slinn, *Comparative Constitutionalism and Good Governance in the Commonwealth. An Eastern and Southern African Perspective*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, s. 65.

creation of the *Oasis Forum*<sup>27</sup> – a loose coalition of NGOs which included: the Council of Churches in Zambia, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia, the Episcopal Conference, the Non-Governmental Organisations Coordinating Council, the Law Association of Zambia and Women NGOs<sup>28</sup>. The Oasis Forum organized campaigns in the Copperbelt and Lusaka against Chiluba's third term in office, it also lobbied among traditional leaders and politicians against amendments of the constitution. The Forum's genesis was very similar to the MMD, however it lacked an infrastructural base, that ZCTU provided to MMD, which could coordinate its action countrywide. Nevertheless the issue of the "third term" was successfully publicized and created internal divisions in the MMD, and forced Chiluba to withdraw from the presidential race and led to Levy Mwanawasa appointment as a presidential candidate.

After the successful "anti-third term" campaign Oasis Forum has not been resolved, it redefined its agenda and focused on the process of constitutional reform. The new president called for Forum's registration arguing, that it is not a civil society movement since its members cannot be defined and the Forum only represents various NGOs leaders.

- **creation of the structure of mutual suspicion and distrust**

Chiluba's second term was a period in which NGOs began to define a structure of mutual suspicion and distrust when interacting with the government<sup>29</sup>. Since 1996 President Chiluba employed rhetoric depicting NGOs as dependent on foreign funds. During his address to Law Association in Zambia he stated:

"It may not be an exaggeration to state that that apart from Churches, Professional Associations and Trade Unions which have identifiable members who pay a subscription to run their organizations many of the remaining NGOs are sponsored agencies or mere conveyors belts of their financiers' positions without membership and without clear aims and objectives. No wonder they get involved in every issue to justify their existence and the financial support they receive. [...] When the time comes to ask NGOs to account for their funds it will be quite interesting to know who finances them, how much they draw from members, how much they pay themselves in salaries and how much else is done in the name of democracy. At the same time paid employees of NGOs should not assume advocacy roles without consulting their general membership"<sup>30</sup>.

It is hard to argue that financial support from abroad does not influence the agendas of NGOs. On the other hand, the argument that advocacy NGOs should be fully dependent on financial support of its members, in practice makes the functioning of advocacy groups impossible in the Zambian context, where the vast majority of the population is preoccupied with day-to-day survival.

All representatives of advocacy groups that the author spoke with confirmed that Zambian politicians do not even try to understand the logic behind advocacy NGOs activity. Politicians "instinctively" accuse advocacy NGOs of practicing political action rather than advocacy. Additionally, the government does not respond to the constant requests to consult NGOs which led to attempts by the Zambian administration to bypass NGOs lobbying for its

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<sup>27</sup> The Forum's name came from the name of the restaurant in Lusaka where it was inaugurated.

<sup>28</sup> Detailed history and analyzes of Oasis Forum origins and activities was presented by Jeremy Gould, J. Gould, *Subsidiary sovereignty and the constitution of political space in Zambia*, in: *One Zambia Many Histories. Towards a History of Post-colonial Zambia*, ed. J-B. Gewald, M. Hinfelaar, G. Macola, Brill, Lusaka 2009, pp. 281-293.

<sup>29</sup> Lumba Singya – the president of one of the biggest Zambian advocacy groups – Women for Change – diplomatically described this relation as *lukewarm*, Interview with Lumba Singya, president of Women for Change, Women for Change main office, Lusaka, 08.09.2010.

<sup>30</sup> F. Chiluba, *Democracy is about rule of law*, Address to the Law Association of Zambia in Ndola, on 30 March 1996, in: „Beyond Political Rhetoric. Zambia. Balancing Political and Economic Reforms. Speeches by President Frederick Chiluba”, ed. R. Sakala, ZPC Publications, Lusaka 1998, pp. 14-15.

cases during international meetings in Lusaka. As a result, NGOs began to treat the government as a major obstacle to the implementation of its policies, and the government presented advocacy NGOs as donor driven agencies without legitimacy and with no political responsibility for the political actions in which they are engaged. Consequently, NGOs adopted a “name and shame” strategy when interacting with the government, and the MMD administration reacted very defensively by not opening any further channels of communication with civil society based organizations. The structure of mutual distrust and accusation about the lack of legitimacy and transparency was reinforced and it became the most influential factor in NGO– government relations in Zambia.

### **3. NGOs political activity after Chiluba.**

The relations between various advocacy groups and the MMD governments under Levy Mwanawasa and Rupiah Banda were dominated by the reinforcement of the aforementioned structure of mutual distrust and accusations regarding a lack of legitimacy and credibility. Three interconnected issues dominated discourse between governments and NGOs – access to information, the drafting of a new constitution, and a transparent tax system and copper revenues management.

Many representatives of the most vocal Zambian NGOs complained about extremely limited access to information regarding the conditions under which multinational corporations mined copper in Zambia<sup>31</sup>. As the contracts between government and mining corporations are classified, the NGOs launched a campaign for the Freedom to Information Bill<sup>32</sup>. Directly related to this issue was the problem of a blurred boundary between the MMD and state owned financial resources. Rupiah Banda was frequently accused of using state resources in order to finance his election campaign in 2011.

On the other hand, government representatives argued that NGOs do not have the legitimacy to undertake political actions, since they are narrow-minded and do not understand the whole spectrum of the mining industry in Zambia<sup>33</sup>. Besides the existence of the ideational structure of mutual distrust, Zambian politicians were attempting to establish a sound narration of the very necessity of distinction between non-governmental and political activity. Interestingly enough, the need for it has been emphasized by members of both major political parties in Zambia. It could be said that politicians defined (or wanted to define) non-governmental activity as service delivery alone, and any kind of advocacy has been declared political activity<sup>34</sup>. Advocacy NGOs staff members were accused of being political actors, agents of foreign or opposition powers and creating “confusions” among Zambians<sup>35</sup>. The government also adopted the *NGO Act* which forced NGOs to produce detailed annual financial statements. Although the yearly reporting of NGO activity is nothing unusual, the

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<sup>31</sup> Interview with a spokesperson of Caritas Zambia Fuvya Nyirongo, Caritas Zambia, Lusaka 09.09.2010; Interview with the spokesperson of the Council of Churches in Zambia - Abraham C. Chikasa, The Council of Churches in Zambia, Lusaka 09.09.2010.

<sup>32</sup> Representatives of NGOs argued that the lack of information created favorable conditions for investors, as nobody except the government could put pressure on investors to act in accordance with the contracts’ provisions. They also made the very powerful argument that as copper is a national resource citizens have a right to know under what conditions it is mined, Interview with F. Nyirongo, Caritas Zambia, Lusaka, 09.09.2010.

<sup>33</sup> Interviews in the Ministry of Mines.

<sup>34</sup> Representatives of NGOs reported that their relations with civil servants and technocrats were proper, sometimes even friendly, and the accusations of acting as political parties were formulated almost exclusively by politicians.

<sup>35</sup> Interview with the spokesperson of the Council of Churches in Zambia - Abraham C. Chikasa, The Council of Churches in Zambia, Lusaka 09.09.2010.

NGO representatives complained about the creation of multiple bureaucratic hurdles, which were regarded as one of the government's channels of influence on NGOs.

Some NGO representatives hoped that the creation of a Zambian branch of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) would lead to the disclosure of mining contracts in Zambia. During the conference on the Implementation of the EITI in Zambia, I asked the question to all representatives of NGOs gathered in Sun Hotel whether they consider any new ways of collaboration with the MMD administration, and what they think about the general attitude of government towards advocacy groups<sup>36</sup>? The answer was laughter, and short replies – one cannot co-operate with this government! This government is corrupted! Banda spends more time in the plane than in Lusaka!, etc. In other words no NGO representative has even perceived collaboration with MMD as possible, and in the last two years of Rupiah Banda rule, NGOs believed that MMD will lost its power, however there was also a lot of distrust in the Patriotic Front (PF) and Michael Sata. NGO representatives argued that any new government will be better than MMD, but simultaneously pointed out that PF politicians in essence were no different than the then political elite, and what is more, most of PF members (including Michael Sata) are renegades from MMD.

It should be noted that the Zambian NGO sector in the early 21st century was characterized by great heterogeneity. There is a visible lack of coordination of actions between various NGOs, and very often they must compete for access to financial resources. The Zambian NGOs are multi-faceted; there are NGOs who work only for the personal benefits of those who created them, some of them are controlled by the MMD administration (so-called GONGOs - government owned NGOs), and some were created in order to facilitate short term aid programs which then subsequently disappeared<sup>37</sup>. The fact that NGOs continuously used a “name and shame” strategy while engaging the government, to some degree promote non-transparent NGOs and legitimized their projects in the eyes of donors. The successes of the National Interim Committee for Multi-Party Democracy and the Oasis Forum have shown that the effectiveness of political advocacy is largely dependent on the ability of NGOs to co-ordinate their actions. It might be argued that in Zambia the practice of alliances and the creation of umbrella organizations is well established however the newly created bodies very often transform themselves into independent NGOs. This was the case with the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction and the Zambia Land Alliance, which in effect started to launch its own projects instead of co-coordinating the actions of its funders.

Until mid 2000 the Zambian political system was unable to create a robust political initiative capable of challenging the MMD. The critical attitude of the advocacy NGOs towards the Rupiah Banda regime was one of the catalysts for MMD's removal from power. However, the structure of mutual distrust and suspicion, established during the first decade of the 21st century, seems to determinate relations between the Michael Sata administration and advocacy NGOs in Zambia.

## Conclusions

The nongovernmental sector is relatively well developed in Zambia when compared with other Sub-Saharan states. Cooperation between NGOs, trade unions and businessman was of crucial importance to the creation of the MMD and Kenneth Kaunda's removal from power.

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<sup>36</sup> *Conference in the Implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in Zambia*, Lusaka, Sun Hotel, 29-30 September 2010, Lusaka, Zambia.

<sup>37</sup> An employee of Civil Society Platform for Poverty Reduction in Zambia, who wished to remain anonymous said, that there is just 5 fully transparent and independent advocacy NGOs in Zambia; Interview with br. Jacek Rakowski, The Missionaries of Africa, Kabwata, Lusaka, 15.09.2010.



After successful division of the Zambian trade union movement, there was no real platform in Zambian politics capable of organising NGOs and of building a robust counterbalance to MMD.

Many advocacy NGOs are dependent on donor support, and the transparency of some NGOs is highly questionable. The results of the surveys conducted among 164 Zambians suggests that almost 90% of Zambians claimed that NGOs are “absolutely necessary for Zambia”, and simultaneously 65% were fully aware that the vast majority of Zambian NGOs are donor driven. At the same time, there are many transparent and vocal NGOs which from 2000 consequently questioned the legitimacy of MMD. The most vocal Zambian NGOs under MMD rule were faith based and church related NGOs, women NGOs and associations of professionals. The example of Oasis Forum demonstrates that NGOs can effectively influence Zambian politics when their activities are coordinated.

The relations between the MMD government and advocacy NGOs were characterized by mutual distrust, and mutual accusations of a lack of transparency and legitimacy. The NGOs principally employed a “name and shame” strategy while engaging the government, and together with the MMD’s suspicious attitude towards NGOs a specific ideational structure of mistrust and mutual suspicion was created, which has proved extremely difficult to break and which dominates government–NGO relations. Furthermore, one can argue that an additional ideational structure in which the Zambian political process takes place is an established tradition of public protests.

Appendix,

Tab. 1.

<i>Does trade union movement have any influence on Zambian politics?</i>		
Yes	78	49,4%
No	70	44,3%
I do not know	10	6,3%
No answer	6	-
Generally	164	100%