Paper short abstract:

This paper questions the protracted electoral reforms in Cameroon by addressing international donors' motives and their consequences on a very low electoral participation.

Paper long abstract:

Since the 1992 contested multiparty elections, international donors and the Cameroonian government have been negotiating around electoral reforms - still considered unsatisfactory by donors, opposition parties and civil society actors. However, elections have been held regularly since then with the result of maintaining in power Paul Biya (president since 1982) and the CPDM (the former single party). This paper wishes, firstly, to understand why donors (mainly the EU and the UNDP) insist on pushing for unlikely reforms, and secondly, to observe the consequences of the reforms on a very low electoral participation. Donors' motives will be addressed from two main hypotheses. First, the UNDP and the EU could not set aside their electoral agenda because they tend to be recognised as "experts" in this field and would suffer from any failed project. Second, the whole community of donors is particularly cautious not to contradict directly the Cameroonian government - which does not rely on international funding for its ordinary budget. The second issue the paper will deal with are the political effects of these protracted reforms. Being progressively "inclusive", the reforms paradoxically produce a close "electoral field" where professionals (be they state agents of the Electoral commission or of the ministry of Administration, civil society experts, NGOs, or international experts) are competing about the reforms while excluding ordinary citizens and political parties. Focusing on international norms and electoral credibility, this new field of political experts aims at securing its know-how and institutions and avoiding any popular disruption.