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Accepted Paper:

Betting on the strongest: the external post-conflict intervention in southern Sudan during the comprehensive peace agreement implementation, 2005-2011  
Aleksi Ylönen (United States International University - Africa)

Paper short abstract:

The paper analyzes aspects of the post-conflict intervention in Southern Sudan in 2005-2011. It argues that the main interveners’ strategy for short-term stability promoted an exclusive political and economic order that may undermine the establishment of peace and development in the long-term.

Paper long abstract:

Since the mid-2000s critics have repeatedly pointed out the lack of "local" ownership and inclusion in post-conflict peace- and statebuilding interventions. In response, many intervening actors have adopted approaches to build "positive peace" through emphasis on the inclusion of the "local". However, this stated commitment has often failed to materialize because the main interveners have tended to commit themselves rather exclusively to narrowly defined statebuilding for short-term stability based on partnerships with the perceivably dominant, or most legitimate, actor. This has often come in expense of extensive engagement in the more gradual, and potentially more inclusive, process of nationbuilding. Arguably, the focus on short-term stability in interventions has produced conditions geared towards the establishment of exclusive political and economic order.

This paper analyzes aspects of the external "peace through statebuilding" intervention in Southern Sudan during the period of Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation in 2005-2011. It shows that this intervention was largely oriented towards achieving short-term stability through the consolidation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army's (SPLM/A's) monopoly of violence and power over the Southern Sudanese political and economic system. However, betting on the limited capacity of the dominant "rebel movement turned government" failed to promote "state" legitimacy among a number of other local groups. It encouraged armed opposition perpetrated by splinter factions from within SPLM/A cadres as well as by other defiant groups, and resulted in a political and economic reality that may defy peace and development in the long-term.

Panel P054
Between internal and external: exploring the dialectics of peace-building and state-building in Africa
  Session 1