Paper short abstract:

Conditionalities play an important role in aid allocation. Yet, the ideals linked to aid can get in the way of relationships between donor and recipient. I look at the ties between France and Cameroon, but also generalizes beyond this dyad. Conditionality is not always in the donor interest.

Paper long abstract:

The proposed paper uses the case-study of Cameroon to examine how critical donors can use their economic aid to shield their authoritarian allies from pressure to pursue democratization. As the wave of democratic reform swept through Africa in the early 1990s, domestic opposition and pressure from the international community forced the ruling clique in Cameroon towards pluralism. However, in this case, instead of encouraging democracy, the key donor, France, helped Cameroonian President Paul Biya maintain his grip on power. As will be demonstrated, massive amounts of French economic aid helped the regime survive both internal and external pressure for change. Under a political conditionality approach other secondary donors tried to use their foreign assistance to help push for liberal-democratic reforms in Cameroon and support the pro-democratic domestic opposition. However, such efforts were undermined by what the key donor perceives as its self-interest. This research attempts to use the case of Cameroon and its close relationship with Paris to illustrate a wider, more general trend in which developed country donors are frequently willing to ignore the authoritarian nature of friendly regimes.