Paper short abstract:

In Africa’s “hybrid regimes” leaders use multi-party elections as a strategy to maintain power. Courts often serve as an arena for the opposition to contest the process, but to what effect? The article proposes and applies a framework for investigating effects of court-involvement in electoral processes.

Paper long abstract:

A core aspect of judiciaries' accountability function is to prevent democratic malfunctioning - which, according to Ely (1080) happens most dramatically when "the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out". In such situations, the courts must act to keep open the channels of political change, participation and communication. In this perspective courts' role in election processes is crucial, but what enables courts to deliver on this mandate? This is an important question in a context where regimes that would on other parameters be regarded as authoritarian increasingly seek legitimacy through multi-party elections. Not least in Africa, multi-party elections seem to be a central strategy for non-democratic leaders to stay in power. In many hybrid regimes or electoral autocracies, courts are central before, during and after elections, including as an arena for the opposition to contest the fairness of the election process and -outcome. What functions do courts play in such contexts? Do they help clear the channels of change and participation and thus strengthen democratic institutions and forces? Or do they serve as means for appeasing the opposition and legitimizing authoritarian regimes, thus effectively aiding the ins in their effort to stay in power? The article proposes a framework for investigating short and longer-term effects of court-involvement in electoral processes. This is used to analyse material from authoritarian or hybrid African regimes where courts have played a role in election processes (Angola; Uganda; Zimbabwe and Zambia).