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Short abstract

This article explores how state actors have influenced the emerging field of post-quantum cryptography (PQC), and how the future of PQC has been anticipated and co-constructed by state and corporate actors as a result.

Long abstract

This paper investigates the standardisation of post-quantum cryptography at the global level. While expected to bring fundamental breakthroughs in various fields, the advent of large-scale quantum computers has been a major source of concern for governments worldwide, as they could break the most common cryptographic systems currently in use. Since the mid-2015s, these concerns led to the emergence of a new field of research known as post-quantum cryptography (PQC). The initial rise of PQC being driven primarily by state-led efforts, this research looks at the capabilities of different governments to direct, or nudge, the standardisation of post-quantum encryption at the global level. This research focuses in particular on the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a global industry-driven standard body, where corporate and state actors negotiate and compete over the formulation of Internet standards. This research draws on a research fieldwork carried out in the IETF between 2023 and 2025, which comprised participant observation and sixteen semi-structured interviews with PQC experts. Studying specific controversies in the IETF reveals the mechanisms through which state actors (such as the U.S and Germany) assert their 'digital sovereignty' in relation to the Internet industry, through direct or indirect means. This article discusses how state actors have influenced the emerging field of post-quantum cryptography, and how the future of PQC has been anticipated and co-constructed by state and corporate actors as a result.

Keywords: State power, standardisation, Internet, encryption, anticipations.