Paper short abstract:

This paper looks at the politics and ethics of attempts to manage unruly biology in a global context and illuminates the ways these efforts have led to the growth of a complex and unruly biosurveillance regime.

Paper long abstract:

After having declared the end of communicable diseases in the 1970's, the global health establishment subsequently reversed its opinion in light of the emergence of HIV/Aids in the 1980's and the ensuing proliferation of bioterror, zoonotic, and infectious disease threats to humans. Consequently, the last four decades have witnessed the expansion of bioseurveillance efforts scaling from the most micro to the most macro levels. Today, more than ever, there exists a broad and deep techno-scientific biosurveillance network- including the mathematical modeling of biocomplexity, strong cross-border laboratory infrastructures and communication, increased medical countermeasures, and tighter immigration enforcement measures- targeted specifically at managing the mutability and mobility of contagious bodies. Despite the ever-increasing reach and strength of this network, however, it seems that the emergence and proliferation of infectious diseases like Ebola, Swine Flu, SARS, and now the Zika Virus continually evade efforts to preempt, prevent, and manage them. This paper looks at the politics and ethics of attempts to manage unruly biology in a global context and illuminates the ways that efforts to contain the circulation of infectious disease have led to the growth of a complex and unruly biosurveillance regime that has proliferated right alongside the diseases it fails to vanquish.