Paper short abstract:

This paper analyses how the Eurozone member states’ will to meet the quantitative “convergence criteria” set in the Treaty of Maastricht contributed to create a favourable environment for the development of PPPs, as well as the political and social effects of this policy.

Paper long abstract:

A significant part of the figures daily manipulated in the sphere of public finance are defined in systems of national accounting such as the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA). Since 1992, this genuine "calculative infrastructure" (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2013) has been integrated to the most ambitious European policy so far: the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In this context, ESA's figures have been used as reference to assess whether member states conform to the "convergence criteria" set in the Treaty of Maastricht, namely the limitation of public debt and deficit to respectively 60% and 3% of their GDP.

In order to meet these criteria without giving up huge investment expenditures, Eurozone member states have developed various "budgetary neutral" financing schemes. For instance, the use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) as an innovative financing mode of public infrastructure has dramatically increased throughout Europe in the last decade, thereby offering excellent insights on the political and social consequences of "indicator politics" in public finance.

Combining insights from sociology of quantification and public policy analysis, this paper analyses how the use of ESA in the context of the EMU has created a strong incentive structure towards the development of such a controversial policy instrument. Based on extended documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews with key European and Belgian senior civil servants, this empirical study demonstrates how European institutions contributed to create a favourable environment for the development of PPPs, as well as the political and social effects of this policy.