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Accepted Paper:
Paper short abstract:
Drawing on the concept of socio-technical imaginaries this paper addresses how Austrian stakeholders in the field of Critical Infrastructure Protection relate technological devices to perceptions of future catastrophe and present (in)security in regard to possible terrorist attacks.
Paper long abstract:
Narratives of inevitable "catastrophes to come", resulting from terrorism are discursively played out on political and public stages. The instruments of possible attacks are far ranging, from "low-tech" bomb attacks to "high-tech" assaults with bio weapons or by cyber-means. In providing what is perceived as the basic needs of society, critical infrastructures are framed as being a likely target and thus at high risk. Security policies are promoting anticipation, preparedness, prevention and protection to address these challenges. Within the assemblage of "future catastrophe", and the perception and exploitation of present (in)security, technologies are key: they can be employed to plan and realize terrorist attacks, are themselves potential targets, and are also conceived of as means of risk reduction by security actors.
Based on a current project on the "Governance of Resilience" within Austria, we are investigating how in the field of Critical Infrastructure Protection Austrian stakeholders describe the connection between future terrorist catastrophes and technological devices. Analytically, we draw on the concept of socio-technical imaginaries (Jasanoff & Kim 2009), as entanglements of visions about social order and technological development. In doing so, we ask which kinds of expectations regarding control and safety are ascribed to security devices, while simultaneously many stakeholders now share the assumption that "absolute" security can no longer be guaranteed. Contributing to the emerging coalitions between STS and Critical Security Studies, we show how these imaginaries are shaping and shaped by present security discourses on possible catastrophes that aim at rendering the unknown future "actionable."
Back to the future: STS and the (lost) security research agenda
Session 1 Friday 2 September, 2016, -