Paper short abstract:

Bottom up synthetic biology has sought to incorporate built-in safety features in genetically modified micro-organisms (GMMOs), which prompts to ask through the lens sociotechnical imaginaries, how this debate has remained an object of contestation, embedding governance ideals in biological systems.

Paper long abstract:

Recent developments in synthetic biology have been accompanied of 'bottom up' approaches that aim to build 'new to nature' forms of nucleic acids and proteins and incorporate them into living systems. Promises of building biosafe technologies have been made, based on the impossibility of transferring genetic material to other organisms and controlling the proliferation of genetically modified microorganisms (GMMOs). However, the safety and release into the environment of GMMOs has been an object of contestation since the 1970s, and pioneers of synthetic biology make an effort to promote its importance, whereas this appears to be less of a concern in other fields, such as the genetic engineering of mosquitoes (i.e. gene drives) to tackle tropical diseases. This paper seeks to make sense of 'biocontainment' as a promise of synthetic biology. I question the concern about the safety of GMMOs, and given the notion of safely releasing GMMOs into the field, how biotechnological applications may be reshaped. These questions are explored with the support of interviews with synthetic biology stakeholders, as well as participant observation in a synthetic biology laboratory. The analysis draws from the literature on sociology expectations, as well as 'sociotechnical imaginaries' (Jasanoff & Kim 2009) —understood as collectively imagined, visions of 'desirable futures' that guide the implementation of science and technology projects—. An imaginary of built-in safe GMMOs suggests not only efforts of scientists to preserve their autonomy and self-governance embedded in the objects they construct, but also brings novel applications and business model possibilities to biotechnology.