Paper long abstract:

When people started to take social and political factors into account to explain the structure of science it was a philosophical landslide. Nowadays even strong relativistic approaches are taken seriously. In contrast to this, the idea of relinquishing the concept of truth in philosophy of science still hasn't found many supporters. Nevertheless there is a handful philosophers who argue in favor of renouncing truth - or at least in favor of taking the concept of truth as optional. I shall concentrate on one of these namely Josef Mitterer who is developing a theory called Non-Dualism.

Ontological queries concerning the nature and the significance of the material world arise when social and political factors are seriously considered within a theory about the scientific enterprise. Even if I think that Mitterer's account is very promising this is an especially sensible issue when non-dualism is discussed.

My aim is to reconstruct the origin of such types of concerns in a non-dualistic setting and to make plausible that there is no need to worry for someone who considers a non-dualistic approach to science. I shall argue that the same reasons, which favor leaving questions about possible ontological statements within the non-dualistic framework undecided, are leading directly to the opportunity and possibility of thinking about a concept of science without truth.