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Short abstract:

What place matching algorithms can take in the cartography of exchange institutions set up in Polanyi’s The Great Transformation? On the basis of the circulation and processing of information, we propose to introduce two new institutions of exchange: the commons and matching arenas.

Long abstract:

This paper aims at defining matching algorithms as a new institution for the allocation of goods. It takes as its starting point the debate between the proponents of centralized planning and the proponents of decentralized market economy. This debate is crucial not only because it is referred to by theorists of matching markets, but above all because it highlights the importance of collecting and processing the information needed to allocate goods (§1). Secondly, we examine the relational form of matching arenas, summed up by the formula “You choose and you are chosen”, and the social structure that enables it to function as an institution of exchange alongside the market and the plan (§2). The central question, then, is what place this institution can take in the cartography of exchange institutions set up by Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation. We propose to recompose this cartography on the basis of the circulation and processing of information, to introduce two new institutions of exchange: the commons and matching arenas (§3). We conclude by considering the political dimensions of matching, taking into account its specific form of quantification of the self, and the way in which the individual and the collective are administered (§4).