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Accepted Paper:

Refugee matching in the making: ongoing collective experiments in refugee resettlement  
Jasper van der Kist (University of Antwerp)

Short abstract:

Refugee matching, inspired by market design, uses algorithms to place refugees. This paper explores refugee matching as ongoing collective experiments, highlighting material arrangements and theoretical influences. Migration remains a political matter despite matchmaking's coordination benefits.

Long abstract:

Algorithm development is emerging as an innovative approach to the multifaceted challenges of migration, with refugee matching systems emerging as a widely revered solution. Inspired by ‘market design’ principles, the designers of these systems use algorithms to match refugees to cities where they are most likely to thrive and be accepted by host communities. Drawing on actor-network theory, this paper examines refugee matching ‘in the making’. By taking stock of the processes involved in the design and implementation of several of these systems in Europe and the US, it aims to outline regugee matching as ongoing collective experiments. Firstly, it describes the material arrangements that are put in place to make refugee matching systems work in particular ways. Particular attention is paid to the investment in calculative equipment establishing relationships between supply and demand, and the establishment of a central clearing house for satisfactory matches. Secondly, drawing on the performativity thesis, it underlines the transformative potential of theoretical ideas in shaping matching dynamics – not limited to economics, but including a wide range of social science disciplines such as migration studies. Thirdly, calculating migration should be understood as a political matter. It shows that, while matchmaking serves as a powerful tool for coordination, controversies are likely to persist about the ways in which relocation should be organised, or they will be redirected to other types of interventions that favour (hardline) political measures. Therefore, the way in which migration cannot readily be absorbed by ‘market designs’ warrants close and critical reflection.

Traditional Open Panel P345
Calculating migration
  Session 2