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Short abstract:

We argue for that it is plausible that AIs can and should be (re)conceptualised as collaborators in art creation. In this paper we attempt to formalise, in postphenomenological and psychological terms, how these human–technology relations should be best understood.

Long abstract:

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) in the creation of artistic works raises profound questions regarding agency, authenticity, artistic quality, and labour, alongside deeper conceptual challenges concerning the definitions of terms such as ‘art’ and ‘artist’. In both scholarly discourse and public debates, there is no consensus on the creative aesthetic capabilities of computer-generated art in general, nor on the specific case of AI-generated artworks.

Critics, sceptical of the artmaking capacities of AI agents, primarily focus their attention upon human qualities like intentionality. The meaningfulness of artwork is traditionally guaranteed by the assumption that an artwork is the consequence of intentional artistic choices made by an artist with a lifeworld akin to ours. With AIs this guarantee is lost: they seem to lack the appropriate intentionality and embodiment necessary for creativity.

Developing insights first articulated in a preliminary manner by Coeckelbergh (2023), we argue for a more optimistic interpretation. Depending on the nature of the AI tool in question (there are non-trivial differences between the capacities of CNNs, GANs, and other image generation tools), it is plausible that AIs can and should—at least under certain circumstances—be reconceptualised as collaborators in art creation. In this paper we attempt to formalise, in postphenomenological and psychological terms, how these human–technology relations should be best understood.