Paper short abstract:

The crisis of expertise can be seen as a debate between quasi-religious communities. Drawing on STS views of science, the anthropology of religion, and Wittgenstein’s “forms of life,” I show that identifying faith-like commitments on both sides of the crisis leads to productive communication.

Paper long abstract:

Controversy persists over the trustworthiness of consensus science—the so-called “crisis of expertise.” Climate change, mask wearing, and vaccinations have become politicized, and communication is difficult between groups who seem to live in different realities. Wearing “Trust Science, Not Morons” t-shirts, while insisting on “cold, hard facts,” does not help. Those who identify an “anti-science ideology” among anti-vaxxers too easily ignore the quasi-religious belief structures on both sides in the crisis of expertise. Indeed, the arrogance of believers in consensus science probably increases distrust of experts. The modesty associated with STS—regarding the tentativeness of even the best science—is necessary for communication in our current tribalism.

The crisis of expertise can best be analyzed in terms of ideology, by which I mean an inevitable worldview (and not Marxian false consciousness). Each “side” should be understood as quasi-religious believers in their facts, not in the sense of deistic belief, but rather as occupying a community with shared practices and a common language. I draw upon (i) T.M. Luhrmann’s anthropology of religion, which sees religious experience and practice as skills derived from repeated attention to, and training in, a set of beliefs, and (ii) Wittgenstein’s notion of Lebensform (form of life) and the work of those in STS inspired by his later philosophy, to conceptualize the opposing sides in the crisis of expertise as quasi-religious communities. Reconceiving science as tentative, together with recognizing each side’s faith-like commitments, will best serve the goals of persuasive communication with respect to scientific disputes.