Send message to Author

Paper short abstract

The Moroccan evil eye (l-ʿayn) acts as a devil-like, distributed force of harm, manifesting in gazes, objects, and relationships. Negotiated through amulets, gestures, and rituals, it externalises social tensions while avoiding direct moral demonisation, offering a relational ontology of evil.

Paper long abstract

This paper approaches the evil eye (l-ʿayn) in the Moroccan context as a devil-like figure: a distributed, nonhuman agent that actualises social tension, moral ambiguity, and the risks of exposure in everyday life. Rather than a singular demonic being such as Satan or Iblis, the evil eye constitutes a relational ontology of evil, in which harm emerges not from deliberate transgression, but admiration, and envy. Often perceived as an uncontrollable force of harm, the evil eye may or may not be embodied in others, but it nevertheless impacts human existence and must be continually negotiated.

In urban Morocco, the evil eye manifests through relationships, gazes, and objects - requiring continuous management through practices such as amulets, gestures, concealment, Qur’anic recitation, and ritual countermeasures. These practices do not merely ward off misfortune but actively engage the evil eye whose presence renders social life morally and ontologically unstable.

Using Viveiros de Castro’s notion of ‘controlled equivocation’, I treat the evil eye as a homonym of ‘the devil’, gesturing to a different referent within a distinct reality. Rather than a singular figure of evil, the evil eye acts like a devil without a body - a mysterious, relational force that externalises social tensions while avoiding direct moral demonisation. By examining how negativity is distributed across relations rather than merely located in individuals, this paper contributes to the panel’s comparative project and suggests how such ontologies of evil may illuminate alternative ways of containing conflict and mitigating moral polarisation.