Paper Short Abstract:

This paper tries to understand how in Libya, in the absence of a referendum, a variety of constituent bodies (elected, self-proclaimed or mandated) coexist and compete with each other? More particularly, how deliberation becomes a central political norm.

Paper Abstract:

The security challenges of organizing a referendum and the Libyan controversies over the modalities of referendum vote of the constitutional project legitimize the claims of different social and political groups to hold or request a constituent function (pre-constituent, original constituent or derived constituent).

To stabilize the political configuration by remaining in power, the members of both parliamentary assemblies elected in 2012 and 2014 (maintained until today), are challenged in their action by a dilemma: they call for respect to democratic legality and claim legislative and constituent monopoly. However, aware that electoral legitimacy provides them neither political domination nor a security guarantee; they assume the need to associate non-elected actors. Thus, the two elected assemblies accept a “measured sharing” of their constituent power with deliberative forums including actors who are not present in these parliamentary assemblies. This “sharing” as political arrangement, put in place, temporarily and repetitively, hybrid bodies (dialogue forums, expert committees, etc.) in the constituent configuration.

This situation weakens established political roles, reveals a deficit in the elected political representation, and opens the way to a hybridization of fields with the inclusion of new contenders for broader political representation. This deficit in representation will also encourage international mediation professionals (UN, EU, special envoys, etc.) to pretend to fix it through the creation of “inclusive” dialogue spaces (outside elected assemblies) to listen the voices of all Libyan components and to find a national compromise.