Paper short abstract:

Mining can be about unearthing resources, but such activity is rarely undertaken without a view to securing future revenue. How do mechanisms like foreign investment protection, securitization of mining rights and financialization of international commodity markets govern in and of themselves?

Paper long abstract:

"We want them to come and dig our mountain" told me numerous people in the Konya region of Guinea where the Simandou mountain chain is located. This mountain chain contains some of the biggest reserves of highest quality iron ore in the world. Once smelted to make weapons for Samory Touré's army, the French colonial regime, Soviet Union and more recently Rio Tinto, Chinalco, Vale, Beny Steinmetz Group (BSGR) and Société Minière de Boké have all explored and planned to exploit this exceptionally rich mineral reserve. Even if to the--perhaps surprising?--deception of the inhabitants of the region only some exploratory tons have been drilled, the potential mine has had a worldmaking existence of its own. Rio Tinto fended off a hostile takeover by BHP Billiton simply by claiming Simandou to be undervalued in its books. BSGR sold its rights to half of the reserve to Vale for US$2.5bn and once the Guinean government had revoked its concession based on accusations of corruption, the company sued the country in World Bank investment arbitration. These mechanisms of financial gain working in the absence of actual mining rely on legal techniques that safeguard property across state territories (foreign investment protection) and create the ability to cash in on future revenue streams (securitization). Those techniques do remake worlds, but how do they govern? How does the distinction of political and technical operate in securing foreign investment? How does such financialized projection differ from the desire for the mountain to be dug?