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Paper short abstract

This paper analyzes the persistence of hereditary politicians in Japan. It shows how institutionalized political careers, constituency structures, and party organization sustain intergenerational succession despite normative commitments to meritocracy and electoral competition.

Paper long abstract

Why does the intergenerational reproduction of political careers persist in Japan, despite strong normative commitments to representative democracy and meritocracy? This paper examines the reproduction of hereditary politicians as an outcome shaped by the interaction of historical path dependence and institutional structures, adopting a political science perspective.

Modern constitutional politics in Japan was institutionalized after the Meiji Restoration with an explicit rejection of feudal status hierarchies. During the prewar period of party cabinets, however, political elites increasingly emerged from bureaucratic backgrounds, and politics gradually became established as a professional career. In the postwar era, under the long-term dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), this institutionalized structure of political careers became entrenched and contributed to the expansion of hereditary politicians, many of whom trace their political origins to prewar bureaucratic elites.

Rather than treating hereditary succession as a normative deviation or institutional distortion, this paper conceptualizes it as a rational outcome produced by party organization, electoral institutions, and constituency structures. Focusing on continuity across the prewar and postwar periods, it explains why repeated postwar calls for political reform and efforts to curb hereditary politics failed to generate substantive institutional change.

Moving beyond explanations centered solely on the multi-member district (MMD) system, the paper analyzes how constituency restructuring, the inheritance of political resources such as support organizations and campaign finance, and enduring linkages between politicians and the bureaucracy have shaped pathways of political succession. Drawing on recent comparative research on political dynasties, the paper argues that the Japanese case illustrates how representative democratic systems reconcile electoral competition with long-term continuity in political careers.